From Beliefs to Virtuous Behaviors: The Influence of God-concepts on Intentions to Volunteer by Johnson, Kathryn A. (Author) et al.
From Beliefs to Virtuous Behaviors:  
The Influence of God-concepts on Intentions to Volunteer 
by 
Kathryn Johnson 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved June 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Adam Cohen, Co-Chair 
Morris Okun, Co-Chair 
Sau Kwan 
Steven Neuberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
August 2012  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
People may conceptualize God as benevolent and as authoritarian.  This 
research investigates the influence of these God-concepts on prosocial behavior; 
specifically whether such concepts differentially predict a set of beliefs about the 
self and the world, volunteer motivations, and intentions to volunteer for secular 
causes.  Two studies, one correlation and one experimental, were conducted 
among college students who were Christians and indicated they believe that God 
exists.  A measurement model of the concepts of Benevolent and Authoritarian 
God was first tested, and a conceptual path model was then analyzed.  I found that 
concepts of a benevolent God were associated with a benevolent self-identity, 
perceived moral and religious obligations to help, and a high sense of personal 
responsibility with a total positive indirect effect on intentions to volunteer – 
mainly via internal motivations.  In contrast, concepts of an authoritarian God 
were associated with a perceived religious obligation, having a positive indirect 
effect on intentions to volunteer via external motivations; but also with a low 
benevolent self-identity and low personal responsibility associated with 
amotivation (the disinclination to volunteer).  Thus, there was a null total indirect 
effect of belief in an authoritarian God on intentions to volunteer.  Future 
directions including the use of religious primes are discussed. 
  ii 
DEDICATION  
     
This dissertation is dedicated to B. L. Koyen, Joan Fitzpatrick, Emilie S. 
Smith, Julie VanderHaar, Francis Frangipane, and Andrew Womack who have all 
instructed me regarding the subtle differences between a benevolent and an 
authoritarian God. 
  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
   
First, I want to acknowledge and sincerely thank Adam Cohen for taking 
me on as student, for providing many opportunities to co-author manuscripts, for 
his caring and professional mentorship, and for sharing his deep understanding of 
the psychology of religion.  I am also especially grateful to Morris Okun for his 
exceptional mentorship, for his patient assistance with statistical analyses, and for 
encouraging me to explore the many ideas that culminated in this research.     
I also wish to thank Virginia Kwan and Steven Neuberg for their helpful 
suggestions in developing the underlying theoretical concepts presented here.  
Many thanks go to my graduate student colleagues for their social support and, 
particularly, to Anna Berlin for her practical and statistical advice.  I greatly 
appreciate the support of Lisa Whitaker who so graciously allowed me to collect 
data in her sociology online courses over multiple semesters.  Of course, special 
thanks also go to the research assistants who helped with data collection in the lab 
and who enthusiastically packaged hundreds of “care packages” for the benefit of 
orphans in Haiti and Mexico.  I also want to acknowledge and sincerely thank the 
John Templeton Foundation and the Notre Dame Science of Generosity Program 
for so generously funding this research.  
 Last, but not least, my utmost appreciation goes to my husband, Carl 
Johnson, for not complaining (too much) about the countless hours and late nights 
I have spent facing my computer or buried in a book and for vigilantly searching 
out key articles in the morning news that furthered this research.  Mostly, I am 
forever grateful for his lifelong encouragement and support.
  iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
          Page 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... vi  
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... vii  
CHAPTER 
1    INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................  1  
Overview and Conceptual Model  ...................................................... 1  
God-concepts  .................................................................................... 4 
God-concepts and psycho-social functioning .................................... 7  
God-concepts and prosocial behaviors............................................... 8  
God-concepts and volunteerism ....................................................... 10   
2    CONCEPTUAL MODEL ....................................................................  14  
Benevolent and Authoritarian Concepts of God .............................. 15  
Beliefs about the Self and the World ............................................... 24 
Volunteer Motives ............................................................................ 29  
Belief and Motivational Pathways Leading to Volunteerism ......... 36  
Moderation Model 2 ......................................................................... 37  
Overview of Studies ......................................................................... 38   
3    STUDY 1: TESTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL (MODELS      
1 & 2) ..............................................................................................  40  
Hypotheses  .................................................................................. 40  
Methods  .................................................................................. 42  
 Participants ........................................................................... 42  
  v 
CHAPTER         Page 
 Procedure .............................................................................. 43  
 Measures ............................................................................... 44 
 Analytic Strategy .................................................................. 51 
Results ............................................................................................... 51  
 Factor Analysis of God-concept Indicators ......................... 51 
  EFA for Benevolent God ......................................... 53 
  EFA for Authoritarian God ..................................... 55 
  Confirmatory Factor Analysis ................................. 57 
 Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables .......................... 60 
 Path Analysis of the Conceptual Model 1 ........................... 64 
  Added Pathways ...................................................... 67 
  Omitted Pathways .................................................... 68 
  Effects of Belief in a Benevolent God .................... 71 
  Effects of Belief in an Authoritarian God ............... 74 
 Tests of Moderation (Model 2) ............................................ 77 
 Post hoc tests ........................................................................ 81 
  Exploratory Tests for Possible Interactions ............ 81 
  The Effects of Protecting and Just God ................... 83 
Discussion  .................................................................................. 84 
 
 
 
  vi 
CHAPTER         Page 
4    STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE EFFECTS OF 
BENEVOLENT AND AUTHORITARIAN GOD-CONCEPTS 
ON INTENTIONS TO VOLUNTEER AND VOLUNTEER 
BEHAVIOR ...................................................................................  86 
Hypotheses  .................................................................................. 87  
Methods: Study 2 .............................................................................. 89 
 Participants ........................................................................... 89 
 Procedure .............................................................................. 90
 Measures ............................................................................... 94 
 Analytic Strategy .................................................................. 97 
Results ............................................................................................... 97  
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in T1 and T2 ............... 97 
 Manipulation Check ............................................................. 99 
Main Effects of the Primes on Volunteer Intentions and   
Volunteer Behavior  ........................................................... 102 
 Main Effects of the Primes on Beliefs and Motives.......... 104 
 Test for Moderation ............................................................ 112 
 Post hoc tests ...................................................................... 113 
Discussion  ................................................................................ 118 
5    SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ........................  123 
Summary of Results ........................................................................ 125 
Limitations and Future Directions .................................................. 129  
  vii 
CHAPTER         Page 
REFERENCES  ......................................................................................................  134 
APPENDIX  
A      BELIEFS ABOUT GOD  ...............................................................  146  
B      BELIEFS ABOUT THE SELF AND THE WORLD  ...................  148  
C      VOLUNTEER MOTIVES  .............................................................  151 
D      INTENTIONS TO VOLUNTEER  ................................................  153  
E      HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL  ..............................................  155  
  viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1.       Goodness of Fit Statistics for Benevolent God and for Authoritarian 
God Measurement Models using EFA in Study 1 ............................  54 
2.       Factor Loadings for Benevolent God-Concept Measurement Model 
(EFA) in Study 1 ................................................................................  54 
3.       Factor Loadings for Authoritarian God-Concept Measurement Model 
(EFA) in Study 1 ................................................................................  55 
4.       Factor Loadings for God-Concept Measurement Model (CFA) in 
Study 1 ...............................................................................................  58 
5.       Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Conceptual Model in Study 1 
 ............................................................................................................  62 
6.       Zero-order Correlations between the Manifest Variables in the 
Conceptual Model, Study 1 ...............................................................  63 
7.       Sequential Chi-square Difference Tests for Model 1 in Study 1 ........  66 
8.       Correlations Between Variables Within Each Class in Model 1 in 
Study 1 ...............................................................................................  71 
9.       Standardized indirect effects depicted in the model from Benevolent 
and Authoritarian God to Volunteer Intentions (final endogenous 
variable)..............................................................................................  72 
10.     Sums of the standardized indirect effects for paths depicted in the final 
model between the exogenous variables BenGod and AuthGod and 
Volunteer Motives in Study 1 ...........................................................  75 
  ix 
Table              Page 
11.     Exploratory analysis of the interactions of God-concepts by Beliefs on 
Volunteer Motivations .......................................................................  82 
12.     Religious affliliation and gender of participants in Study 2 ...............  89 
13.     Primes for AuthGod and BenGod conditions with percentage of 
participants’ ratings of scriptures as authoritarian or benevolent .....  91 
14.     Primes for Religion Control and Secular Control conditions with 
percentage of participants’ ratings of scriptures (Religion Control) as 
neither authoritarian nor benevolent .................................................  92 
15.     Descriptive statistics in Study 2, across all groups, for variables in the 
conceptual model at T1 and T2 .........................................................  98 
16.     Differences in scores for BenGod scale, single item “God is 
benevolent,” AuthGod scale, and single item “God is Authoritarian,” 
by condition, in Study 2 ...................................................................  101 
17.     Standardized indirect effects for paths depicted in the final model 
between the exogenous variable BenGod and the endogenous 
variables: Motives, Volunteer Intentions, and Volunteer Sign-Up, in 
Study 2 .............................................................................................  115 
18.     Standardized indirect effects for paths depicted in the final model 
between the exogenous variable AuthGod and the endogenous 
variables: Motives, Volunteer Intentions, and Volunteer Sign-Up, in 
Study 2 .............................................................................................  116 
 
  x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1.       Conceptual Model of the Mediated Effects of Beliefs in a Benevolent 
God and Authoritarian God in Intentions to Volunteer ......................  3 
2.       Hypothesized God-Concepts Measurement Model from Study 1 ......  20 
3.       Conceptual Model Adding Hypothesized Interaction Effects ............  38 
4.       Significant Path Coefficients in the Structural Model 1 in Study 1 ...  70 
5.       Significant Path Coefficients and Correlations in the Interaction Model 
2 in Study 1 ........................................................................................  78 
6.       Plot of Interaction of Benevolent God by Benevolent Self on Internal 
Motivation to volunteer in Study 1 (N = 425)...................................  80 
7.       Plot of Interaction of God-concept by Personal Responsibility on 
Amotivation .......................................................................................  83 
8.       Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Benevolent 
Self and Internal Motives ................................................................  106 
9.       Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Moral 
Obligation and Introjected Motives .................................................  107 
10.       Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Religious 
Obligation and External Motives ....................................................  109 
11.     Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Personal 
Responsibility and Amotivation ......................................................  111 
12.     Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for BJWO and 
Amotivation .....................................................................................  112 
  xi 
Figure Page 
13.     Path Model from Study 1 with data from Study 2 ............................  114 
14.     Plot of Interaction of AuthGod by Religious Obligation on 
Amotivation .....................................................................................  118 
15.     Revised Conceptual Model – Benevolent God .................................  127 
16.     Revised Conceptual Model – Authoritarian God ..............................  128 
  1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
People conceptualize God in various ways such as a compassionate father, 
a commanding judge, or an immaterial force.  Those concepts of God have 
been shown to relate to a number of personality, attitudinal, and behavioral 
consequences including agreeableness (Froese & Bader, 2010; Saroglou, 
2002), self-esteem (Benson & Spilka, 1973), moral judgments (Morewedge 
& Clear, 2008), and aggression (Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 
2007). However, researchers have not yet sufficiently addressed how the 
variability in concepts of God may function differently in respect to 
prosocial behavior.  One important kind of prosocial behavior is 
volunteerism – the giving of one’s time and effort without compensation, often 
for the benefit of non-kin and members outside of one’s social or religious group.  
The present research investigates the direct and indirect effects of benevolent and 
authoritarian God-concepts on volunteerism using both correlational and 
experimental designs. 
Overview and Conceptual Model   
 The concept of a high, moralizing, punishing God, watching from 
above, appears to keep human behavior in check by fostering extrinsically-
motivated cooperation (Shariff, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2009; Swanson, 
1968).  Just as the implied presence of a human observer can heighten 
reputational concerns and, thereby, reduce anti-social behaviors, the awareness of 
a divine watcher can also curb anti-social behavior – particularly if God is a stern 
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judge who is able to punish (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011).  As societal size 
increases, groups with high, punishing, all-knowing Gods often become more 
cooperative and less subject to in-group fragmentation – particularly in harsh 
environments (Roes & Raymond, 2003; Snarey, 1996).  However, the more 
strongly one identifies with a particular group, the more susceptible he or she may 
be to ingroup biases and dislike for members of outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979) – particularly when there is a perceived threat to status or resources 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; D. Johnson & Bering, 2009).  Thus, concepts 
of a commanding, judging, punishing God may dissuade people from 
volunteering for the benefit of outgroups.  However, religious people are 
typically the most likely to volunteer, even for secular organizations 
(Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood, & Craft, 1995; Ruiter & DeGraaf, 2006).   
 I propose that, whereas concepts of an authoritarian God have been 
shown to be associated with ingroup solidarity, derogation of outgroups, and 
reputational concerns, concepts of God as a benevolent care-giver are more 
likely to be associated with a compassionate self-identity, an increasing 
sense of moral and religious obligations to help those outside one’s own 
social group, and a personal responsibility to help others. As shown in the 
Conceptual Model in Figure 1, the concept of a benevolent God is expected 
to be associated with particular beliefs about the self and the world which, in 
turn, are associated with certain intrinsic (internal and introjected) and extrinsic 
(external) motives for volunteering – mitigating the belief that helping is useless 
(amotivation).   Intrinsic motivations coupled with extrinsic motivations to help 
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are likely to be associated with intentions to volunteer (e.g., Clary, et al., 1998; 
Gagne, 2003; Grano, Lucidi, Zelli, & Violani, 2008). 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Mediated Effects of Beliefs in a Benevolent 
God and Authoritarian God on Intentions to Volunteer 
 
 
Indicators for each of the manifest variables and correlations within each class of 
variables are omitted for clarity.  
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religious group.  Consequently, the positive association between introjected and 
external motivations and intentions to volunteer may be degraded or offset by 
beliefs that volunteering is unwarranted (or even useless) – particularly when 
helping is for the benefit of the undeserving (i.e., miscreants and outgroup 
members).   In sum, although an authoritarian God-concept is often effective as a 
deterrent to anti-social behavior (e.g., Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011) such concepts 
may be less likely to induce prosocial behaviors such as volunteerism. 
In Study 1, I test the structure of the Conceptual Model and expect to find 
that only the concept of a benevolent God facilitates intentions to volunteer (since 
the concept of an authoritarian God both elicits and inhibits intentions to 
volunteer).  In Study 2, I test the hypothesis that priming a benevolent God-
concept will be associated with increased volunteer motivations, volunteer 
intentions, and secular volunteerism, relative to priming an authoritarian God-
concept or control. 
God-concepts 
 Beliefs about the existence, attributes, and activities of immaterial agents 
appear to be central in the lives of all religious people and the origin and function 
of these beliefs has been prominent in theorizing about religion’s evolutionary 
roots (Boyer, 2001; Atran & Norenzayan, 2004).  Although many religious 
adherents conceptualize a high, moralizing God (e.g., Meier, Hauser, Robinson, 
Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007; Roes & Raymond, 2003; Swanson, 1968), there is 
great variation in the attributes, activities, morphology, origin(s), and social roles 
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of deity(ies) both within and between religious traditions (see Hopfe & 
Woodward, 2004).  
 Beliefs about the nature and character of God are referred to as God-
concepts in the psychological literature.  (The affective response to thoughts of 
God is sometimes differentiated and referred to as the God-image in the 
psychoanalytic tradition; Hoffman, et al., 2008).  Psychological researchers, for 
the most part, have focused on two God-concepts: benevolent and authoritarian.  
As discussed in the following section, a benevolent God may be thought of as 
being aware of one’s needs, being attentive, protective, loving, caring, forgiving, 
kind, and generous among other positive attributes (Benson & Spilka, 1973; 
Froese & Bader, 2010; Rosmarin, Krumrei, & Andersson, 2009).  For many 
religious people God is also authoritarian: restricting, controlling, angered by sin, 
wrathful, severe, and punishing.  This view of God focuses less on God’s acts for 
the benefit of humans and more on how God commands, controls, and punishes 
people who behave anti-socially (Shariff, et al., 2009).   
Concepts of God as benevolent and authoritarian can be thought of as 
separate dimensions (cf. Benson & Spilka, 1973).  For example, an individual 
may strongly believe that God is both benevolent and authoritarian.  In a national 
sample assessing the extent to which participants thought of God as wrathful and 
punishing, Froese & Bader (2010) found significant variation both within 
religious congregations and between denominations.  For example, 70% of Black 
Protestants, 50% of Evangelical Protestants, 22% of Catholics, and 15% of Jews 
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rated God as authoritative.  Yet, even within the same congregation, there were 
individual differences in ratings of God as benevolent and authoritarian.  
 Another dimension of God-concept is the extent to which God is deemed 
to be distant, impersonal, or undefined vs. person-like and engaged in human 
affairs (Froese & Bader, 2010; Krejci, 1998).  For example, although the ancient 
Hebrew texts often refer to God by various human-like traits or acts (e.g., The 
Lord of Hosts or the Lord who Provides; Berlin, Brettler, & Fishbane, 2004; 
Unger, 1988/1957), these references to God in anthropomorphic terms may be 
contrasted with later  philosophical  views that God can only be described in 
terms of what God is not, rather than in terms of what God is (i.e., apophatic 
theology; Samuelson, 2003).  In the U.S. today, beliefs about God are often 
eclectic with many imagining God as a pervasive cosmic force rather than a 
person-like deity (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2009).   
 Concepts of God as benevolent, authoritarian, or distant and undefined are 
available in every theistic religious tradition.  In Islam, for example, Allah is 
conceptualized as both punitive and merciful, or as Light (Hourani, 1991), Hindu 
gods and goddesses may be malevolent or benevolent avatars but the Self is also a 
part of the divine (Babb, 1975; Flood, 1996), and Christians, too, may imagine 
and relate to God as punishing judge, benevolent savior, or Spirit within (Kunkel, 
Cook, Meshel, Daughtry, & Hauenstein, 1999; Noffke & McFadden, 2001).   
However, concepts of God as a distant cosmic force or an ultimate reality, for 
example, do not provide a volunteer role model (as does the concept of a 
benevolent God).  Nor do concepts of a distant God imply that God is watching 
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(as does the concept of an authoritarian God).  As Fyodor Dostoevsky has been 
attributed, “If God is dead, then anything is permitted” (Froese & Bader, 2010). 
Therefore, the proposed research is limited to investigating the effects of concepts 
of a benevolent and an authoritarian God.  I do not measure or manipulate the 
effects of undefined or abstract God-concepts on prosocial attitudes and behavior 
in this research. 
God-concepts and psycho-social functioning  
 Specific concepts of the divine can be important predictors of the 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of religious individuals.  Chronically held 
concepts of God as loving and caring are typically associated with increased self-
esteem (Benson & Spilka, 1973) and secure attachments to others, including 
romantic partners (Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1992).  Those who believe that God is 
loving but not punishing have been shown to be more agreeable on a Big Five 
personality assessment (Froese & Bader, 2010; Saroglou, 2002). Orthodox Jews 
who conceptualized God as loving and attentive, and not angry, were also much 
less likely to be anxious or depressed relative to their non-Orthodox Jewish 
counterparts  (Rosmarin, Pirutinsky, Pargament, & Krumrei, 2009); and the 
concept of a loving God has been linked with psychological health in other 
populations as well (Hill & Pargament, 2003). 
 On the other hand, women who think of God as controlling and 
authoritarian report more hopelessness (Steenwyk, Atkins, Bedics, & Whitley, 
2010), and those with an image of a high, controlling God have been shown to 
have negative affective reactions to God primes (Wiegand & Weiss, 2006).  When 
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presented with scriptures related to God’s wrath and sanctioned violence, people 
were more likely (relative to control) to punish losers in a game with loud blasts 
of air, a measure of aggression (Bushman, et al., 2007).  
 Concepts of God also correlate with social attitudes.  In national surveys 
assessing Americans’ perceptions of God, Froese and Bader (2010) found that 
most Americans think of God as being benevolent; however, the degree to which 
God was deemed to be authoritarian was a robust predictor of prejudice toward 
homosexuals and social attitudes ranging from (being against) stem-cell research 
to preferring that the church rather than the government care for the poor.  People 
with a concept of God as wrathful and punishing were also four times more likely 
than those with a benevolent God-concept to believe that God allows tragedies to 
occur as a warning or punishment to sinners.   
Beliefs about God’s nature as benevolent and authoritarian are 
differentially associated with certain beliefs about the self and the world.  Further, 
it seems likely that those beliefs, in turn, may differentially predict intentions to 
engage in prosocial behaviors. 
God-concepts and prosocial behavior 
 Social psychologists define behaviors that benefit others, or society in 
general, as prosocial; and one important category of prosocial behavior is 
“helping.”  Helping behaviors may be further classified in three ways: (1) planned 
vs. spontaneous helping, (2) indirect vs. direct helping  (Pearce & Amato, 1980), 
and (3) the recipient of the helping behavior.  Whereas spontaneous helping 
involves unplanned acts such as helping a stranger change a flat tire, planned 
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helping involves deliberate efforts to assist others; for example, delivering weekly 
meals to a frail grandparent.  Indirect helping includes generous acts such as 
giving one’s possessions to charity, whereas direct helping entails giving one’s 
time to help those in need. Finally, helping behavior can be directed toward kin 
and kith, to members of one’s own church (e.g., religious in-group), or to 
strangers and members of an outgroup (e.g, Catholics helping Jews during the 
observance of Yom Kippur). 
 Much research has been conducted concerning spontaneous helping, 
prompting Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, and Penner (2006) to say the literature 
“may even have reached the state in which we can say that no more [research] is 
needed!” (p. ix).  In contrast, these psychologists state that less is known 
regarding sustained, planned helping – particularly how formal helping may be 
associated with religious beliefs (p. 155-156).  Moreover, because it is an 
observable, sustained, planned activity, variability in rates of volunteerism are not 
easily explained by immediate situational factors (e.g., bystander effects, etc.) 
and, instead, are likely to be related to chronic beliefs and attitudes about the self 
and others – and, I propose, concepts of God. 
 People are likely to help those who are related (Bryan, Hammer, & Fisher, 
2000), or like themselves (see Dovidio, 1984), or who share group membership 
(Flippen, Hornsteein, Siegal, & Weitzman, 1996).  Much of the literature on 
volunteerism has included activities that directly benefit an individual’s offspring 
(e.g., transporting neighborhood children to school, little league coaching, etc.; 
Becker & Dhingra, 2001; Garland, Myers, & Wolfer, 2008).  However, it is often 
  10 
dissimilar others – those outside one’s religious or social group – that typically 
need help; for instance, the poor, the immigrant, prisoner, rape victim, orphan, 
and a host of others.  In the proposed studies, I have chosen to focus on planned 
acts of helping directed toward those who are outside one’s family or religious 
group, what I term secular volunteerism. This focus is consistent with the 
following definition of formal or organizational volunteering as an unpaid, 
voluntary activity that involves “. . . taking actions within an institutional 
framework that potentially provides some service to one or more other people or 
to the community at large” (Piliavin & Siegl, 2007, p. 454). 
God-concepts and volunteerism  
 It is well documented that religious people volunteer more than non-
religious people (Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood, & Craft, 1995; Ruiter & DeGraaf, 
2006).  However, there are mixed results in rates of planned volunteering across 
religious groups (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Berger, 2006; Driskell, Lyon, & 
Embry, 2008; Taniguchi & Thomas, 2010) and not all religious people volunteer.  
This opens up interesting questions about how different religious beliefs and 
volunteer motives might vary between individuals within these groups.  
Specifically, do some concepts of God lead religious people to engage in the 
prosocial behavior of secular volunteering while other God-concepts do not?   
 First, people who have developed a higher sense of self-esteem, a strong 
sense of self-efficacy, and close social relations are more likely to volunteer  
(Okun, Pugliese, & Rook, 2007; Wilson, 2000).  Since these personal 
characteristics and views of the self are also known to be associated with 
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benevolent God-concepts (Benson & Spilka, 1973; Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1992; 
Roberts, 1989), it seems reasonable to expect that concepts of a benevolent God 
may also be associated with increased rates of volunteerism. 
 Second, humanitarian values are often the most important reason cited for 
volunteering (Allison, Okun, & Dutridge, 2002; Carlo, Okun, Knight, & Guzman, 
2005; Clary & Snyder, 1999) and belief in a benevolent God may reflect the value 
of benevolence.  In the development of a classification system of human values, 
Shalom Schwartz found that the values of benevolence (e.g., helping, caring, and 
forgiving) and universalism (e.g., protecting the weak, and treating all justly) 
involve caring and concern for others, self-transcendence and a nurturing 
personality.  In contrast, the values of dominance (e.g., control, authority, and 
commanding) and power (e.g., resource acquisition, wealth, and material success) 
are associated with self-enhancement, personal focus, anxiousness, and a 
domineering attitude toward others.  Again, it stands to reason that placing a 
higher value on benevolence and universalism would be associated with a 
benevolent God-concept and, consequently, predict increased rates of secular 
volunteerism relative to the more self-focused values of obedience and authority 
(which, I suggest, correspond more closely to an authoritarian God-concept).   
 Third, although religious adherents in nearly all faith traditions are 
instructed to be generous, merciful, and benevolent (even to the stranger and the 
social outcast), religious obligations are sometimes inconsistent with personal 
desires or felt moral obligations – particularly when the individual thinks of God 
as an impersonal, powerful force (Morewedge & Clear, 2008). Religious people 
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may attend services, abstain from certain foods, or avoid temptations out of 
obedience but without internally desiring to do so – but because of a sense of 
tradition or community (Cohen, Hall, Koenig, & Meador, 2005).  Therefore, 
believing that God (and the religious community) expects benevolent acts and that 
there will be punishment for non-compliance constitutes an external motivation, 
but need not imply that one personally values benevolence.  To the extent an 
individual believes God is a strict judge who punishes transgressions, that 
individual may feel compelled to volunteer out of obedience, feeling guilty if he 
or she does not help and, consequently, be likely to volunteer. 
 On the other hand, in highly restrictive or exclusive groups, individuals 
often exhibit a strong ingroup bias and a corresponding denigration of outgroup 
members (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  In that case, it becomes unlikely that a person will 
volunteer to aid outgroup members (Reed II & Aquino, 2003).  Taken together 
then, the effects of moral or religious obligation coupled with potential outgroup 
denigration may “wash out” with no aggregate effect of belief in an authoritarian 
God on intentions to volunteer. 
A personified God can become an influential social agent.  Although 
human role models certainly provide examples of prosocial behavior, Christians 
may view Jesus Christ as the quintessential altruist – a role model who gave up 
his life for the benefit of outgroup members, with no apparent reward or 
compensation.  Religious people may also think of God as an important, person-
like, agent who is superior to humans, having strategic knowledge about their 
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inner thoughts, motives, and actions (Boyer, 2001).  God is also thought to have 
special powers and to be able to dispense rewards and punishments for prosocial 
behavior – but with eternal significance.   
 Unlike human role models who can be seen, heard, and publicly observed, 
concepts about the nature, thoughts, and intentions of God are left largely to the 
imagination of the religious adherent.  Such concepts can develop after personal 
reflection or through interactions with parents and important others (Beck & 
McDonald, 2004; Dickie, Ajega, Kobylak, & Nixon, 2006; Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 
1992). However, the process of religious socialization is never complete and there 
is wide variation in conceptualizations of God. It is precisely because concepts of 
God are so variable that they can serve different functions.  However, researchers 
have not yet adequately addressed the functionality and behavioral outcomes of 
diverse concepts of God, or how they might relate differentially to prosocial 
behavior and, particularly, to rates of volunteerism.  In the next section, I propose 
a conceptual framework that links God-concepts to beliefs about the self, the 
world, volunteer motivations, and intentions to volunteer. 
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Chapter 2 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 A conceptual model is proposed with pathways indirectly linking beliefs 
about God as benevolent and authoritarian to intentions to volunteer (Figure 1 
above). First, on the left side of the model, beliefs about God as benevolent and 
authoritarian are theorized to influence beliefs about the self and the world.  These 
beliefs about the self and the world are posited to affect volunteer motives, 
derived from the application of self-determination theory to volunteerism. These 
motives, in turn, are predicted to be associated with intentions to volunteer.   
The purpose of the present research was twofold.  The first goal (Study 1) 
was to test the overall fit of the conceptual model as well as the direct effects and 
indirect (mediated) effects suggested by the model.  Although the correlations 
among the variables and the direct effects of God-concepts and Beliefs about the 
Self and the World on Volunteer Motivations and Intentions to Volunteer are not 
depicted in the model to reduce complexity, these were also tested and accounted 
for as discussed in the following sections.   
The terms “mediated,” “direct or indirect effects” are commonly used to 
describe the relations between variables in models using cross-sectional designs; 
however, such correlation designs do not provide sufficient evidence for 
causation.  Instead, the best way to determine the causal direction of those 
associations is by using experimental manipulations.  Thus, a second goal of this 
research was to test the causal direction of the relation between concepts of God 
and beliefs about the self and the world as discussed in the following sections. 
  15 
Benevolent and Authoritarian Concepts of God 
 There has been a fair amount of research investigating how religious 
individuals conceptualize God, and researchers have generally had participants 
rate various adjectives to identify different dimensions in thinking about God.  In 
the first of these studies, a 64-adjective measure of God-concepts developed by 
Spilka, Armatas, and Nussbaum (1964) was administered to 228 female, Catholic 
college students and then to 364 undergraduates at a large university.  Using a Q-
sort task, at least six types of God-concepts were identified: Kindly (helpful, 
merciful, forgiving, and protective), Stern (demanding, punishing, and stern), 
Vindictive (wrathful, avenging, and damning), and three impersonal views of God 
as Allness (infinite, absolute, wise, and unchanging), Distant (inaccessible), and 
Supreme Ruler (majesty and sovereignty).   
 Gorsuch (1968) posited that these concepts of God map on to the three 
dimensions of general meaning of all concepts as proposed by Osgood and 
colleagues (1957; 1962): evaluation (e.g., safe vs. dangerous), potency (e.g., 
strong vs. weak), and activity (e.g., active vs. passive).  Using undergraduates’ 
ratings of how well 63 adjectives from Spilka, et al., (1964) and 28 adjectives 
from Osgood’s semantic differential research described God, Gorsuch conducted 
a factor analysis and identified four factors that corresponded with previous 
research.  First, a “Kindly” God was described by items such as charitable, 
comforting, considerate, fair, forgiving, gentle, gracious, just, kind, loving, 
merciful, and patient.  Second, representative adjectives describing a “Wrathful” 
God were avenging, blunt, critical, cruel, damning, hard, jealous, punishing, 
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severe, sharp, stern, tough, and wrathful.  Other factors included descriptors such 
as impersonal, distant, passive, inaccessible (“Deistic” factor) or infinite, 
omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient (“Omni-ness” factor).  
Subsequently, Benson and Spilka (1973) tested concepts of a loving God 
and a controlling God using a semantic differential assessment of ten pairs of 
adjectives, in a sample of 128 Catholic high school boys.  In the Benson-Spilka 
scale, five adjective pairs define a Loving vs. not-Loving God (accepting-
rejecting, loving-hating, saving-damning, forgiving-unforgiving, and approving-
disapproving) and five pairs defining a Controlling vs. not-Controlling God 
(demanding-not demanding, restricting-freeing, controlling-uncontrolling, strict-
lenient, and rigid-permissive).  These researchers then related these God-concepts 
with self-esteem and locus of control, finding that self-esteem was positively 
correlated with the Loving God scale and negatively correlated with the 
Controlling God scale.  These correlations remained significant even after 
controlling for religiosity, church attendance, and SES. 
 Drawing on theories of self-perception and interpersonal relations, 
Lawrence (1997) administered a different God Image Scale to 1,580 U.S. adults.  
Rather than a list of adjectives, the God Image Scale involves rating the extent to 
which a participant endorses 72 statements about God and their relationship with 
God.  Similar to earlier studies identifying themes of distance, loving-kindness, 
and punishment-control, Lawrence used a factor analytic approach and found 
three dimensions: belonging (presence and challenge), goodness (acceptance and 
benevolence), and control (influence and providence).  Within each of these 
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dimensions two sub-sets were identified as focusing on either the self or the 
nature and intentions of God: belonging (God’s nearness to the self which is 
differentiated from God’s challenge for personal growth), goodness (self being 
acceptable to God which is differentiated from God’s benevolence toward the 
self), and control (one’s perceived influence on God which is differentiated from 
God’s control over the self).   
   More recently, using an 85-item card sort and a survey derived from a 
phenomenological probe of 20 college students, Kunkel and his colleagues (1999) 
developed a concept map of representations of God with two dimensions: punitive 
vs. nurturant and mystical vs. anthropomorphic.    
In a similar analysis of a 27-item card sort, and using a sample of 215 
adult (mean age 37 years) Lutheran college undergraduates, Krejci (1998) found 
that concepts of God varied along three dimensions: Positive-Negative 
(supporting, caring, and patient vs. judge and master), Controlling-Saving (stern, 
distant, demanding vs. redeemer, divine, and savior), and Concrete-Abstract 
(mother, father, protector vs. infinite, perfect, and just).  Krejci also found that 
males were more like to endorse the concept of a controlling God. 
In sum, there have been multiple methods (open-response, card sorts, 
ratings of God-concept statements, adjective lists), multiple types of analyses 
(factor analyses, multidimensional scaling), and multiple research goals (e.g., 
linking God-concepts with self-esteem, locus of control, life satisfaction, and 
gender differences).  Yet no psychometrically sound, standard measure of God-
concepts has been generally adopted in the literature.  Moreover, previous studies 
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have often been plagued by small sample sizes (e.g., n = 20; Kunkel, et al., 1999), 
non-representative samples (e.g., all Catholic high school boys or girls; Benson & 
Spilka, 1973), and adjective checklists which vary across studies in both number 
and content of the items.  However, there is some consensus that concepts of an 
anthropomorphic, person-like God are generally found to be either positively 
(loving and benevolent) or negatively (punishing and authoritarian) valenced. 
Moreover, these concepts of God as benevolent and authoritarian are associated 
with a host of psycho-social attitudes and behaviors indirectly related to prosocial 
behavior including depression (authoritarian God-concepts; Rosmarin, et al., 
2009), the attribution of others’ misfortune to the will of God (authoritative God-
concept; Froese & Bader, 2010), and the belief that the government should 
distribute wealth more evenly (benevolent God-concept; Froese & Bader, 2010). 
 Consequently, in order to test the conceptual model, there was a need to 
develop an internally reliable set of indicators which would uniquely define the 
concepts of Benevolent and Authoritarian God.  In considering what might 
constitute the breadth of items that define the concepts of Benevolent and 
Authoritarian God, Krejci’s (1998) study provides the most recent research with 
an adequate sample size (n = 215) and data collected from Christian college 
students, all of whom were Catholic or non-Catholic Christian.  In that study, 
Krejci used a card-sort measure to investigate the dimensional structure of 27 
adjectives representing roles that God plays such as “Judge,” personality traits 
that might be attributed to God such as “Gentle,” theologically correct terms such 
as “Perfect,” and gender-typical roles that God might assume such as “Father.”  
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Participants sorted the adjectives and nouns which were printed on cards into 
categorical piles and, consistent with previous literature, a multidimensional 
scaling analysis revealed a three dimensional structure:  (Dimension 1) God as 
Nurturing (e.g., supporting, caring) versus Judging (e.g., judge, master); 
(Dimension2) Saving (e.g., redeemer, savior) versus Controlling (e.g., stern, 
demanding); and (Dimension 3) God as Concrete  (e.g., mother, father, protector) 
versus Abstract (infinite, just).   
It should be noted that Krejci’s terms nurturing, judging, saving, 
controlling, concrete, and abstract were all labels imposed by the researcher as 
interpretations of the multidimensional scaling analyses – these labels were not 
among the 27 adjectives presented to participants.  Moreover, the 27 adjectives 
used in Krejci’s study were limited in two ways.  First, there were only two items 
associated with some end-points of the dimensions (e.g., Judging and Master).  
Second, ten of the 27 adjectives and nouns were located in the center of the 
conceptual space indicating that they only weakly loaded on the critical positive 
and negative end points.  Nevertheless, Krejci’s study represents the most recent 
research informed by previous literature and suggests three important dimensions 
in thinking about God.  
Thus, following Krejci (1998), the key attributes of a Benevolent God 
were proposed to be (1) Helping (i.e., nurturing), (2) Forgiving (i.e., saving), and 
(3) Protecting; and the key attributes of an Authoritarian God were proposed to be 
(1) Punishing (i.e., judging), (2) Commanding (i.e., controlling), and (3) Just & 
Fair (i.e., abstract).   
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Figure 2. Hypothesized God-concepts measurement model from Study 1 
 
 
 
Indicators for the six proposed first-order latent variables (Helping, Forgiving, 
Protecting and Commanding, Judging, and Just & Fair) and the relation of the 
first-order latent variables to the two key hypothesized second-order latent 
variables: belief in a Benevolent God and belief in an Authoritarian God.  
Indicators in italics were omitted in the final CFA model.  Note: Error terms are 
not depicted in this model. 
 
The next step in developing a reliable measure of the concepts of 
Benevolent and Authoritarian God was to identify potential items, or adjective 
descriptors, to serve as indicators of each of these six key attributes.  In other 
words, the goal was to create subscales to measure the two central concepts of 
Benevolent God and Authoritarian God.  Ideally, each subscale should have good 
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internal reliability, three to five indicators, and these indicators should have 
relatively high and unique loadings on each particular subscale.  Further, each 
subscale should be a unique and reliable indicator of one of the latent variables: 
Benevolent God or Authoritarian God. 
Drawing from descriptors used in previous research (Benson & Spilka, 
1973; Froese & Bader, 2010; Gorsuch, 1968; Kunkel, et al., 1999; Spilka et al., 
1964), adjectives were selected as items for three subscales representing the 
concept of a Benevolent God and three subscales representing an Authoritarian 
God as shown in Figure 2.  
Benevolent God.  
Helping God [Helping, Compassionate, Caring, Generous, Concerned].  
For religious people, thinking of God as a nurturing care-giver may provide a kind 
of psychological role model for helping.  These adjectives are descriptive of 
helping others in some way to repair or recover from personal misfortune.  Thus, 
high ratings of a belief in a helping God are predicted to be associated with a self-
identity as also helping, as well as the belief that one has a moral and religious 
obligation to help.  One may reason, “The world is not fair, bad things happen, 
and people need to be helped along the way.”  In addition to a benevolent self-
identity, a strong belief in a nurturing, helping God is expected to be associated 
with a sense of personal responsibility to help. 
Forgiving God [Forgiving, Gracious, Accepting, Merciful, Pardoning].  
These adjectives describe the belief that God is not holding people’s sins and 
mistakes against them. For religious people, thinking of God as being forgiving 
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may be associated with an increased willingness to help because, importantly, 
people are no longer blamed for their own misfortunes.  This is consistent with 
the religious doctrines of redemption and grace prominent in Protestant 
Christianity.  Belief in a forgiving God may be associated with the forgiveness of 
outgroup members as well and, consequently, the willingness to volunteer for the 
benefit of those outside the family or religious group.  One may reason, “The 
world is not fair, people do wrong, but all people are accepted, forgiven and, 
consequently, deserving of help.”  However, strong belief in a forgiving God may 
also reduce religious obedience (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011). 
Protecting God [Protecting, Shielding, Defending, Sheltering, 
Guarding].  These adjectives are most descriptive of helping individuals avoid 
misfortune.  Many religious people may think of God as a divine protector who 
watches over them.  Belief that God is also protecting may be associated with a 
moral (humanitarian) and religious (God will help me if I help others) obligation 
to help, and may also increase a benevolent, nurturing, self-identity.   
Authoritarian God. 
Commanding God [Commanding, Strict, Controlling, Restricting, 
Stern].  These adjectives describe God as Master - a ruler with strict rules of 
conduct.  Belief in a commanding God should be associated with a sense of moral 
obligation, and a keen awareness of religious obligations –but not necessarily an 
intrinsic desire to help.  Those adhering to God’s strict code of conduct would 
most likely expect others to do the same, believe that the world is just, and believe 
that individuals are held accountable for their actions.  Thus, those who 
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conceptualize a stern, commanding God may expect other individuals to care for 
themselves.   
Punishing God [Judging, Master, Angry, Wrathful, Critical, Punishing].  
Reminders of a judgmental and punishing God can lead to aggression (Bushman, 
et al., 2007), hopelessness (Steenwyk, Atkins, Bedics, & Whitley, 2010), 
depression (Rosmarin, et al., 2009) and blaming victims for their misfortunes 
(Froese & Bader, 2010).  People who are aggressive, depressed, and who blame 
others would be unlikely to feel intrinsically motivated or personally responsible 
to volunteer to care for those others.  Further, if an individual believes that others 
are being punished via their misfortunes (measured as Belief in a Just World for 
Others and differentiated from Belief in a Just World for the Self; Lipkus, 
Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996), that individual may also reason that there is no use in 
helping.  On the other hand, to the extent that an individual believes that one has a 
religious obligation to help others, then belief in a punishing God may also 
increase obedience regarding divine commands, leading to volunteerism. 
Just & Fair [Just, Fair-minded, Unbiased, Impartial].  These adjectives 
describe the belief that God is a perfectly fair judge – people get exactly the 
rewards and punishments they deserve.  The belief in a just God is expected to be 
associated with the corresponding belief that God’s world is also just and fair - 
BJWO.  Those who believe in a just and fair God – and a just world – may reason 
that people reap what they sow.  Such individuals may feel a lack of personal 
responsibility to help others who (ostensibly) have “earned” their circumstances 
as a just reward (or punishment). 
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In sum, the Helping and Punishing aspects of God’s nature can be seen as 
involving God’s intentions regarding either physical care or physical harm to the 
self.  The Forgiving and Commanding aspects capture the tension between 
religious doctrines of grace (freely forgiven) and “law” (obedience to divine 
commands and their consequent rewards and punishments) - distinctions that may 
be most salient for Christians.  The Protecting and Just & Fair aspects of God 
involve concepts of God as either a personal, parent-like, anthropomorphic being 
that actively protects and cares for people or God as an abstract operative 
principle of predictable, just, and fair causes and effects in the world.   
Thus, the measurement model to be tested takes into account the multi-
dimensionality of God-concepts and affords a comprehensive understanding and 
clear definition of both Benevolent and Authoritarian God-concepts, the critical 
exogenous variables under investigation in this research. 
Beliefs about the self and the world 
 Conceptualizations of God as benevolent and authoritarian are posited to 
be related with five beliefs about the self and the world: Benevolent Self-identify, 
Moral Obligations, Religious Obligations, Personal Responsibility, and BJWO.  
 Benevolent Self-identity.  Beliefs about God often correspond with one’s 
own values, opinions, and self-identity (Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, 
& Cacioppo, 2009; Roberts, 1989; Sharp, Gibson, & Johnson, 2011), and many 
religious people value benevolence (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004; 
Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Positive images of God as nurturing and caring 
have been shown to be highly correlated with positive images of the self (Bassett 
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& Williams, 2003; Benson & Spilka, 1973; Roberts, 1989).  Consequently, an 
individual who thinks of God as benevolent is also likely to value benevolence 
and strive to be generous, helpful, and forgiving, in accord with the value of 
benevolence as defined by Schwartz & Huismans (1995).  A person who self-
identifies as benevolent would see himself or herself as compassionate and caring  
(Crocker & Canevello, 2008).   
 Importantly, having a positive image of God has also been associated with 
better social relationships (Simpson, Newman, & Fuqua, 2008).  Further, people 
who act in benevolent or altruistic ways – i.e., giving time and resources to others 
without compensation – are more likely to be deemed trustworthy and sought out 
in coalition formation (e.g., Putnam & Campbell, 2010).  Consequently, a 
Benevolent Self-identity is expected to be a strong, indirect, and positive predictor 
of intentions to volunteer. 
Moral Obligation.  Moral obligations arise in part from social norms and 
in part from internalized values and intuitions cutting across several domains 
(e.g., harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and 
purity/sanctity; Haidt & Graham, 2007).   
All religious traditions do stress the importance of helping others (see 
Dovidio, et al., 2006), and belief in a Benevolent and/or an Authoritarian God is 
expected to be associated with a perceived Moral Obligation to help. 
However, the moral obligation to help should also be grounded in moral 
intuitions about caring and the internalized value of benevolence.  Indeed, 
personal values are often cited as a primary reason for volunteering (Hodgkinson, 
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Weitzman, & Kirsch, 1990; Snyder & Omoto, 2000), and the belief that helping 
others is a positive behavior is an important precursor to helping (Ajzen, 1991; 
Carlo, et al., 2005; Grano, et al., 2008).  Consequently, although the social norms 
for religious people of any ilk should dictate a moral obligation to help, those who 
value forgiveness and compassion are particularly likely to have a strong belief in 
a Benevolent God and a corresponding strong sense of a moral obligation to help 
others. 
 Religious Obligation.  Moral obligations and religious obligations are not 
the same and may be associated with different views of God (Morewedge & 
Clear, 2008). Whereas Moral Obligations arise partly from the expectations of 
others and partly from internalized values, Religious Obligations are entirely 
external to the self.  For example, the Bible (and scriptural texts from other faith 
traditions) instructs people to help the poor, the needy, and even strangers (e.g., 
Leviticus 23; The Good Samaritan parable).  God commands helping and the 
commandments must be obeyed.  However, religious individuals may act out of 
compliance with religious commands, but may not have internalized the desire to 
do so.  This notion is consistent with the finding that religious people may attend 
services, abstain from certain foods, or avoid temptations out of obedience but 
without internally desiring to do so (i.e., for external reasons; Cohen, et al., 2005).   
To differentiate between Moral and Religious Obligations in the present 
research, “Religious Obligation” is added to the model. 
Personal Responsibility.  Moral obligations to help arise when there is 
some awareness of adverse consequences to others coupled with the recognition 
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that another person (e.g., the self) is able to help (Schwartz, 1968). Nevertheless, 
people may report that they are exceptionally concerned about social issues such 
as helping the homelessness or feeding the hungry, and yet admit they are doing 
nothing to address these concerns (White & Plous, 1995).  There are many 
justifications for not acting, and in a series of experimental studies, Schwartz 
found that despite endorsement of volunteer norms, those who denied personal 
responsibility were unlikely to act (Schwartz 1968, 1973; Schwartz & Howard, 
1981).  Indeed, accepting personal responsibility has been shown to be a robust 
predictor of volunteer behavior, especially in cases where there are many 
justifications for not helping (e.g., there are lots of others who can help, I have too 
much schoolwork, etc.; Schwartz, 1974). 
 The willingness to help others, even if no one else is helping, has also 
been referred to as Social Responsibility and it is measured as one of seven 
components of the Prosocial Personality Battery (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & 
Freifeld, 1995).  The Social Responsibility subscale falls on the “other-oriented 
empathy” dimension of the Prosocial Personality Battery (the other dimension is 
“helpfulness”) and correlates highly with the Big 5 personality trait of 
Agreeableness.   
The Social Responsibility scale (also referred to as the Ascription of 
Responsibility scale) is unusual in that all but one item is reverse scored and the 
scale was actually intended to measure the correspondence between social norms 
and the ascription of personal responsibility to the self (Schwartz, 1968).  
Schwartz (1973) found, for instance, that social norms may not be activated when 
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people deny personal responsibility.  That is, when the costs of helping increase – 
or when one does not intend to help – denial of social norms, blaming others, and 
excusing themselves (i.e., “it’s not my problem”) is thought to be a defensive 
cognitive strategy to assuage feelings of accountability or guilt (Schwartz & 
Howard, 1980, 1981).  On the other hand, some people feel internally and 
personally motivated to act and do not use the inaction of others as a “way out.”   
 To convey the meaning of the scale more clearly, I have labeled the 
variable Personal Responsibility rather than Social Responsibility in the present 
research.  The measure is particularly useful in the conceptual model in its 
relation to internal and external volunteer motives.  An individual who scores 
high on the reverse scored Personal Responsibility scale is likely to have less 
regard for what others are thinking and doing as a determinant of their own 
behavior (i.e., volunteerism is neither determined nor excused by social norms). 
Instead, these individuals are intrinsically motivated by their own personal, 
internalized values. 
 Because concepts of a Benevolent God are associated with high self-
esteem, self-efficacy, and agreeableness (Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1992; Roberts, 
1989; Saroglou, 2002; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Wiegand & Weiss, 2006), I 
predict that the concept of a Benevolent God will also be associated with higher 
rates of perceived Personal Responsibility. 
 On the other hand, those with a belief in an authoritarian God may be 
more focused on God’s wrath and, therefore, less likely to help those who are 
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deemed to be religious transgressors or as members of the “wrong” religious 
group.  In that case, helping may not be viewed as a religious obligation at all.  
Belief in a Just World for Others (BJWO).  BJWO measures the 
tendency to blame the needy as being responsible for their misfortune (Furnham, 
2003; Lipkus, et al., 1996).  In other words, high scores on the BJWO scale 
indicate that the individual believes “people get what they deserve” and volunteer 
helping may be perceived as unwarranted. For example, Pichon and Saroglou 
(2009) found that BJWO partially mediated the relation between orthodox 
religiosity and negative helping attitudes – especially toward immigrants.   
 Thoughts of a benevolent God are expected to mirror a benevolent self-
identity – an attitude of forgiveness, compassion, and care for others.  An 
authoritarian God-concept (i.e., a God whose concern is justice and dispensing 
rewards and punishments) is predicted to correspond with beliefs that the world is 
also just; that is, good acts and good character are rewarded with good fortune, 
whereas transgressions and bad character are punished with misfortune.  In a 
BJWO framework, people get what God thinks they deserve.  This is precisely the 
logic of the Protestant Work Ethic (Weber, 1958/1988) and suggests that people 
with an authoritarian God-concept may not help others.  
Volunteer Motives 
 A third class of variables is motivational determinants of volunteering.  An 
important antecedent of any planned behavior is the intention to act (Theory of 
Planned Behavior; Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen, Czasch, & Flood, 2009). In the case of 
volunteering, the intention to act is related to a number of “functional 
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motivational” antecedents typically measured by the Volunteer Functions 
Inventory (VFI) including: self-esteem, humanitarian values, personal rewards, 
and meeting the expectations of important others. Of these, intrinsic, humanitarian 
values are often the most important motive (Allison, et al., 2002; Carlo, et al., 
2005; Clary & Snyder, 1999).   
In an alternative approach, volunteer motives culled from self-
determination theory (SDT) have been incorporated in recent models of 
volunteerism (Gagne, 2003; Grano, et al., 2008).  SDT proposes six types of 
motives including: no motivation to volunteer (amotivation), compliance 
(external regulation), feelings of guilt or self-esteem (introjection, partial external 
regulation), adopting a value as one’s own (internalization/ identification), a sense 
that the value is emanating from the self (integration), and, finally, a purely 
intrinsic motivation of personal interest or enjoyment.  Identified, integrated, and 
intrinsic motivations are considered to be autonomous or internal motivations, 
meaning that the desire to act is perceived as a feeling of volition without external 
rewards or punishments.  SDT holds that people who are self-motivated rather 
than externally controlled (by coercion or reward) are more enthusiastic, 
persistent, creative, and satisfied with life (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
In the present research, the SDT approach rather than the volunteer 
functions approach is employed because of the stronger conceptual links from 
beliefs about the self and the world to the SDT volunteer motives as compared to 
the volunteer functions motives. More specifically, the beliefs about the self and 
the world can be tied to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic orientations 
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that provide the theoretical underpinning for the SDT approach. For example, acts 
of helping as stemming from benevolent self-identity are associated with an 
intrinsic or internal orientation; whereas acts of helping stemming from a 
religious obligation related to God’s expectations are associated with an extrinsic 
or external orientation.    
 In a recent study, Grano et al., (2008) applied these SDT pathways to 
intentions to volunteer and found that as the value of helping others becomes an 
integrated aspect of the self, positive attitudes about helping increase, although 
intrinsic motivation (i.e., volunteering simply for pleasure or personal learning) 
was not a significant predictor of intentions to volunteer.  
 In two pilot studies, the association between the six SDT motives and 
volunteer frequency was investigated in separate samples of college students (n = 
233; n = 1,167) using the Motivation to Volunteer Scale (Grano, et al., 2008). 
Replicating Grano’s findings, the Integrated self-identity motive exhibited the 
strongest correlation with reported volunteering, r = .59; r = .43, p’s < .001.  The 
Integrated motivation (measuring volunteer identity) and Internalized motivation 
(measuring personal value of volunteering) were also highly and positively 
correlated in both studies, r = .78; r = .73, p’s < .001. Because these two scales 
measure nearly the same construct, they are collapsed in the conceptual model as 
“Internal Motivation.”   
Grano et al. (2008) also found that people volunteer for External (earthly) 
rewards and to avoid criticism by important others.  However, in two pilot studies, 
avoiding the criticism of one’s religious group and the promise of heavenly 
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rewards (i.e., religious External motives) were not significantly correlated with 
volunteer frequency.  This is consistent with self-determination theory (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000) and with Gagne’s (2003) finding that internal motives are more 
powerful predictors of volunteerism than are external motives. 
 In the Conceptual Model, four motivations – Internal (i.e., Integrated and 
Identified), Introjected, and Amotivation are included as antecedents of intentions 
to volunteer as discussed below.  Although External motives have been shown to 
be only weakly correlated or uncorrelated with volunteer frequency, External 
Motives are also included in the model inasmuch as they are important in self-
determination theory which undergirds the conceptual model.  Further, the 
dependent variable in the conceptual model is the intention to volunteer and not 
volunteer frequency (as in the pilot studies and previous research).  
 Internal Motivation.  Self-identifying as a volunteer is a robust predictor 
of continued volunteerism (Callero, Howard, & Piliavin, 1987; Finkelstein, 2008). 
A benevolent self-identity includes the belief that helping others is a positive 
behavior (Grano, et al., 2008) and that compassion is an important value in one’s 
life (Carlo, et al., 2005; see also Crocker & Canevello, 2008).  The importance of 
identifying as a volunteer or having a Benevolent Self-identity is underscored by 
research showing that self-identity (i.e., Integrated motivation) predicts behavioral 
intentions over and above previous behavior, positive attitudes toward 
volunteering, or subjective norms (e.g., Sparks & Shepherd, 1992; Terry, Hogg, & 
White, 1999).  Further, activities that are repeated serve to reinforce the behavior 
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as a component of self-identity, often reinforcing an individual’s identity as a 
volunteer (Callero, et al., 1987; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Terry, et al., 1999).  
 Thus, a Benevolent Self-identity is expected to be positively associated 
with Internal motivations to volunteer, and the Benevolent God  Benevolent 
Self-Identity  Internal motivational pathway is expected to have a significant 
and positive indirect effect on intentions to volunteer. 
 Introjected Motivation.  People with a perceived moral obligation to help 
others may feel guilty if they do not volunteer.  First, the expectations of 
important others are powerful motivations for volunteering (Clary, et al., 1998) 
and people may feel guilty for not conforming to social norms.   
More importantly, a perceived Moral Obligation to help others is also 
associated with the value of benevolence and, consequently, an internalized 
motivation to help others.   An individual is likely to feel guilty if he or she does 
not help those in need. 
Both the Benevolent God and Authoritarian God-concepts are expected to 
be associated with Moral Obligations.  Moral Obligation elicits feelings of guilt if 
one does not act (i.e., Introjected Motivation).  Thus, Benevolent God and 
Authoritarian God  Moral Obligation  Introjected Motivation pathways will 
have significant, positive, indirect effects on intentions to volunteer. 
External Motivation.  Volunteerism is typically defined as a planned 
behavior that “offers little or no tangible reward” (Finkelstein, 2009; Penner, 
2002); so, not surprisingly, external motivation has been shown to be a weak 
predictor (Gagne, 2003; Grano, et al., 2008; Stukas, Worth, Clary, & Snyder, 
  34 
2009), or uncorrelated (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2010), with frequency of 
volunteerism.   However, whereas moral obligations may be grounded in strictly 
humanitarian concerns, religious obligations are associated with a system of 
(often eternal) rewards or punishments in accord with divine commands, and 
these external rewards may motivate Intentions to Volunteer as discussed above.  
Therefore, External Motivation is included in the Conceptual Model to account 
for the posited indirect effects of Religious Obligation on Intentions to Volunteer.  
That is, in an SDT framework, the motive most closely associated with the 
entirely external demands of Religious Obligation is “External motivation” – 
volunteering in order to earn recognition, to obtain rewards, or to avoid criticism 
(or punishment) from important others (e.g., God and religious group members). 
This emphasis on obedience to God’s commands and the expectation of 
others may be accentuated by a corresponding increase in participation in 
religious group activities, another strong predictor of volunteerism (Jackson, et 
al., 1995; Park & Smith, 2000).  People who are especially prone to obey God’s 
commands may also be more likely to join a religious group; and religious group 
membership can provide opportunities to volunteer (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; 
Okun, Pugliese, & Rook, 2007).   
 Both the Benevolent and Authoritarian God-concepts are expected to be 
positively associated with Religious Obligations.  I hypothesize that Religious 
Obligation is positively associated with External motivations to volunteer, and 
that Benevolent God/ Authoritarian God  Religious Obligation  External 
Motivation pathways will have significant, positive, indirect effects on intentions 
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to volunteer.  However, it is expected that the indirect path from God-concept to 
Intentions to Volunteer via External Motivation will be weaker relative to the 
pathway via Internal Motivation. 
 Amotivation.  Just as a benevolent God-concept is expected to be 
associated with a benevolent Self-identity, belief in an authoritarian God may be 
associated with more critical attitudes toward others, particularly if an individual 
believes that the world is just and people get what they deserve.  Belief in a just 
world (for others) leads people to blame others for their misfortunes, thus 
reducing motives for helping (e.g., Pichon & Saroglou, 2009).  Therefore, 
Amotivation (volunteering is perceived as a “useless waste of time”) is expected 
to be associated with low intentions to volunteer and not volunteering.  
 I hypothesize that Personal Responsibility will neutralize justifications for 
not helping, thereby decreasing Amotivation.  The Benevolent God  Personal 
Responsibility  Amotivation pathway will have a significant and positive 
indirect effect on Intentions to Volunteer because a benevolent God-concept 
increases personal responsibility – a willingness to help even if others do not.   
 The Authoritarian God  (denial of) Personal Responsibility  
Amotivation pathway will have a significant and negative indirect effect on 
intentions to volunteer because an authoritarian God-concept is grounded in a 
rewards-and-punishments, “just world” belief system. Consequently, one is only 
personally responsible for his or her own actions and circumstances.   
 Similarly, I predict that BJWO will increase Amotivation (i.e., lack of 
motivation) to volunteer, and that Authoritarian God  Belief in a Just World for 
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Others  Amotivation pathway will have a significant and negative indirect 
effect in predicting intentions to volunteer. 
Beliefs and motivational pathways leading to volunteerism 
To summarize the general conceptual model, the beliefs in a benevolent 
and an authoritarian God are functionally different, and are expected to be 
associated with different downstream predictors of prosocial behavior.  These two 
functionally different concepts of God are theorized to relate to specific beliefs 
about self and the world as discussed above. Benevolent God is associated with 
(1) Benevolent Self-identity which is a predictor of Internal motivations and 
robust intentions to volunteer, (2) perceived Moral Obligation to help others 
which, in turn, is associated with Introjected Motivations (guilt if one does not 
help) and Intentions to Volunteer, (3) Religious Obligation to help others, which  
is associated with External Motivations, and (4) Personal Responsibility (i.e., a 
willingness to help even if others do not), which is also associated with Internal 
Motivations and Intentions to Volunteer.  Three of these four paths (Benevolent 
Self, Moral Obligation, and Personal Responsibility) constitute a suite of beliefs 
related to benevolence and an overall intrinsic desire to help others – the most 
potent predictor of Intentions to Volunteer. 
Conceptualizing an Authoritarian God also leads to (1) a perceived Moral 
Obligation to help others, and (2) Religious Obligation to help.  However, an 
Authoritarian God-concept is also associated with: (3) the denial of Personal 
Responsibility (i.e., I will only help if others help first) which is theorized to be 
associated with Amotivation, and diminished Intentions to Volunteer; and (2) 
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BJWO, which is also theorized to be associated with Amotivation.  Extrinsic or 
external motivations are only weakly associated with Intentions to Volunteer.  
Further, the positive indirect effects of Moral Obligation and Religious Obligation 
are expected to be degraded or even negated by the negative (Amotivation) 
pathway via Belief in a Just World and lack of Personal Responsibility. 
Moderation (Model 2) 
Research on conceptions of God is in its infancy, and researchers have not 
investigated the possibility that thoughts of a benevolent God or an authoritarian 
God might interact with beliefs about the self and the world to affect volunteer 
motives.  Therefore, in Model 2, God-concepts are conceptualized as moderators 
that interact with beliefs about the self and the world to either support or 
discourage volunteer motivations as shown in Figure 3.   
First, since a belief that God is benevolent (forgiving of self and others, 
compassionate, and protecting) is consistent with a benevolent self-identity, an 
increase in scores on Benevolent God may augment the relation between 
Benevolent Self and Internal Motivation.  Second, belief in a benevolent, 
forgiving God may alleviate guilt if moral obligations are not acted upon.  Thus, 
the relation between Moral Obligation and Introjected Motivation may be reduced 
by increased belief in a benevolent God. 
Third, a belief that God is authoritarian (the author of strict rules of 
conduct, just and fair, rewarding obedience and punishing disobedience) is 
consistent with the belief that there are external rewards and punishments for 
compliance with, or disobedience of, divine commands.  Therefore, the relation 
  38 
between Religious Obligations and External Rewards may be amplified as belief 
in an Authoritarian God increases. 
Figure 3. Conceptual model adding hypothesized interaction effects 
 
 
Indicators for each of the manifest variables and correlations within each class of 
variables are omitted for clarity.   
 
Finally, a strong belief in God as authoritarian may reinforce the belief 
that, if people are to blame for their own misfortunes (i.e., BJWO), there is no 
need to help them – the misfortune they are experiencing is most likely deserved.  
Consequently, authoritarian God-concepts are expected to amplify the relation 
between BJWO and Amotivation. 
Overview of studies 
In Study 1, the constructs of Benevolent and Authoritarian God are 
investigated.  Using the scales that most clearly defined the two God-concepts, the 
mediational pathways of the Conceptual Model (Model 1) and the moderating 
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effects of Benevolent God and Authoritarian God (Model 2) were tested in an all-
Christian (Catholics and non-Catholic Christians) college student sample. 
Approximately 78% of the U.S. population self-reports being Christian (Pew 
Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008), with 60% to 80% believing in a personal 
God.  Therefore, Christians are an important population for initial testing of the 
directional effects suggested by the conceptual model. Although Catholics and 
non-Catholic Christians differ in some respects (Li, Johnson, Cohen, Williams, 
Knowles, & Chen, 2010), they also rely on the same foundational scriptural texts, 
share belief in Jesus as a benevolent savior, and endorse volunteerism as a 
prosocial behavior.   
In Study 2, Benevolent and Authoritarian God-concepts were 
experimentally manipulated in order to test the causal direction of the relation 
between concepts of God and beliefs about the self and the world.  Further, Study 
2 included a behavioral measure designed to test whether the beliefs and 
motivations in the proposed model predict volunteer behavior as well as 
intentions to volunteer. 
  40 
Chapter 3 
STUDY 1: TESTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL (MODELS 1 & 2) 
 Study 1 consisted of an online survey to examine the mediated effects of 
beliefs in a Benevolent and Authoritarian God on intentions to volunteer, via 
beliefs about the self and the world and volunteer motivations as shown in Figure 
1 (see Chapter 1).  Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested: 
Hypotheses 
H1: Belief in a Benevolent God (BenGod) will have a significant and 
positive indirect effect on Intentions to Volunteer via Benevolent Self-identity 
(BenSelf) and Internal Motivation (Internal).   
H2: Belief in a Benevolent God will have a significant and positive 
indirect effect on intentions to volunteer via Moral Obligation (MoralObl) and 
Introjected Motivation (Introjected). 
H3: Benevolent God will have a significant and positive indirect effect on 
Intentions to Volunteer via Religious Obligation (RelObl) and External 
Motivation (External). 
H4: Benevolent God will have a significant and positive indirect effect on 
Intentions to Volunteer via Personal Responsibility (PersResp) and Internal 
Motivation, as well as via Amotivation. 
H5: Authoritarian God (AuthGod) will have a significant and positive 
indirect effect on Intentions to Volunteer via Moral Obligation and Introjected 
Motivation. 
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H6: Authoritarian God will have a significant and positive indirect effect 
on Intentions to Volunteer via Religious Obligation and External Motivation. 
H7: Authoritarian God will have a significant and negative indirect effect 
on intentions to volunteer via Personal Responsibility and Amotivation. 
H8: Authoritarian God will have a significant and negative indirect effect 
on intentions to volunteer via BJWO and Amotivation. 
Interactions. 
The conceptual model tested in the present study posits that beliefs about 
God are associated with downstream beliefs about the self and the world which, in 
turn, are predictors of volunteer motives.  However, beliefs about the self and the 
world may, instead, be augmented, or suppressed, by related beliefs about God. 
Thus, an alternative model is proposed in which beliefs about God act as 
moderators of certain beliefs about the self and the world to either increase or 
decrease the strength of their relations with volunteer motives (Figure 2).  
Hypotheses specific to Model 2 are: 
H9: As scores on BenGod increase, the relation between Benevolent Self 
and Internal Motives will increase.   
H10: As scores on BenGod increase, the relation between Moral 
Obligation and Introjected Motive will decrease.   
H11: As scores on AuthGod increase, the relation between belief in 
Religious Obligation to help and External Rewards will increase.   
H12: As scores on AuthGod increase, the relation between BJWO & 
Amotivation will increase. 
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Methods 
Participants.  
Participants were undergraduates attending Arizona State University.  All 
participants were enrolled in either Psychology 101 or in online sociology courses 
unrelated to religion.  All sociology students received extra course credit and all 
psychology students received partial credit in fulfillment of course requirements.   
Recent samples at this university include about 24% Atheist or Agnostic, 
25% Catholic or Orthodox, 31% Mainline Protestant or Evangelical Christian, and 
20% Other.  Although data was collected from all religious groups, Catholics and 
non-Catholic Christians (hereafter referred to as Christians) are an important 
volunteer population and may differ in response patterns when contrasted with 
Muslims or Jews, for example.  Therefore, only Christians were included in the 
analyses in Study 1.   
There were 454 Christians who participated in the survey.  To guard 
against careless survey participation, one page of the online survey included a 
distractor page explaining that people often hurry through surveys and asking 
participants not to provide a 1 to 7 Likert response to the statement, “Here is the 
question that you should not answer.”  Participants who responded with any rating 
were deemed to have not followed the survey instructions and were omitted from 
the analyses (n = 7).   
 Belief in God is a central assumption in the proposed theoretical model of 
religious volunteerism.  Therefore, participants were also carefully screened for 
belief in God using two different measures: (1) rating of 3 or more, “God might 
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exist,” on a five item multiple choice question at the beginning of the survey, and 
(2) rating of 4 or more on a 7-point Likert scale question asked near the end of the 
survey, “To what extent do you believe that God exists?”  Participants who 
reported belief in God as less than 3 on the multiple-choice measure or as less 
than 4 on the Likert-scale measure were excluded from the study as not having 
met the inclusion criteria (n = 20). 
 The 427 Christian participants who successfully completed the online 
survey and who reported belief in God were comprised of 165 Catholics and 262 
non-Catholic Christians.  There were 163 males (64 were Catholic), 263 females 
(101 Catholic) and one with missing data.  Participants were Euro-American 
(66%), Hispanic (21%), or other (13%) ethnicity, and were normally distributed 
across five socio-economic classes with 49% reporting being middle class.   
Procedure. 
The online survey consisted of three sections: Beliefs about the Self and 
the World (Self & World Section), Volunteer Experience, Motivations, and Intent 
(Volunteer Section), and Religious Beliefs (Religion Section).  The three sections 
were presented as though they were unrelated studies as described ahead.  In order 
to guard against ordering effects, there were two versions of the survey: SVG 
(Self & World, Volunteer, and God) and VSG (Volunteer, Self & World, and 
God).  Because the measures in the Beliefs about God Section are hypothesized to 
activate prosocial behaviors, these measures were always presented last, 
following the Self & World and Volunteer Sections.   
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To diminish response bias due to conceptually linking the different survey 
sections, participants were told they would be randomly chosen to participate in 
three of a possible six different surveys.  First, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two versions of the survey by birth month.  After 
completing the first section, participants were then ostensibly randomly chosen 
for the “second survey” based on their choice of a favorite color or favorite fruit.   
The online survey consisted of the measures discussed below.  For each 
measure, unless otherwise indicated, participants were asked to rate the extent to 
which they agreed with at least three statements regarding: (1) beliefs about the 
nature of God, (2) beliefs about the self as benevolent, (3) beliefs about the world, 
(4) motivations for volunteering, and (5) intentions to volunteer.  All ratings were 
assessed on a 1 to 7 Likert scale. 
Measures. 
 Beliefs about the nature of God (Appendix A).   
 As discussed in the previous section and as shown in Appendix A, 30 
adjectives were selected to represent the constructs of Benevolent God (BenGod) 
and Authoritarian God (AuthGod) derived from previous research (Benson & 
Spilka, 1973; Froese & Bader, 2010; Krejci, 1998; Kunkel, et al., 1999; 
Rosmarin, et al., 2009; Spilka, et al., 1964; Steenwyk, et al., 2010; Wiegand & 
Weiss, 2006).  From these 30 adjective descriptors, I expected to create three sub-
scales under BenGod (God as Helping, Forgiving, and Protecting) and three 
subscales under AuthGod (God as Commanding, Punishing, and Just & Fair).   
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 On a separate page of the survey, participants were also asked to what 
extent they think “God is Benevolent (helping, forgiving, protecting)” and “God 
is Authoritarian (commanding, just, punishing).”   
Beliefs about the self as benevolent (Appendix B).  
Aquino and Reed (2002, 2003) have shown that a high sense of “moral 
identity” expands the psychological boundaries of the ingroup with a 
corresponding perceived obligation to help others.  These researchers assessed 
moral identity by presenting a list of traits associated with being a “moral” person 
(caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and 
kind) and asking participants to rate the extent to which they identified with these 
traits.  They found there is both an internal (beliefs) and external (self-reported 
behaviors) dimension of a moral self-identity.   
Following Reed and Aquino, participants were provided with a list of five 
adjectives characterizing a benevolent person from adjectives used in various 
published value scales (e.g., Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995).  The 
adjectives were: caring, compassionate, accepting of others, generous, and 
helpful.  The external behavior questions referred to membership in organizations 
and involvement in activities related to volunteerism.  Therefore, although all 10 
questions were administered, the external dimension of a benevolent self-identity 
was not included in the measure of Benevolent Self. Thus, the Benevolent Self 
scale consisted of the six items measuring an internalized benevolent self-identity 
as indicated in Appendix B. The reliability coefficient of the Benevolent Self 
(Internal) scale was .79. 
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Beliefs about the World (Appendix C). 
 Moral Obligation. Because there was not a published scale to assess a 
perceived moral obligation to volunteer, four items were created: “People have a 
moral obligation to volunteer to help others,” “I personally feel I have a moral 
obligation to volunteer to help others,” “If a stranger needs help, a person who is 
able to provide it has a moral obligation to do so,” and “Helping others is an 
important moral activity.”  The reliability coefficient for the Moral Obligation 
scale was .77. 
 Religious Obligation. Similarly, four items were created to assess the 
perceived obligation to obey religious commands to help others: “God expects 
people to obey the commandments,” “I have a religious obligation to help others,” 
“God commands people to help one another’” and “The scriptures command 
people to help others.”  Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with the 
statements on a 7-point Likert scale (alpha = .81).   
 Personal Responsibility.  The Social Responsibility subscale is one 
component of the larger Prosocial Personality Battery (Penner, et al., 1995) and 
falls on the other-oriented empathy dimension of the Prosocial Personality 
Battery.  Borrowed from Schwartz & Howard (1981), the scale was originally 
called Ascription of Responsibility and presents interpersonal situations in which 
participants either accept or deny responsibility to act.  Sample items are “When 
people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat them well” and “I 
would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a clean one.” 
As can be seen from the items listed in Appendix C, the gist of the scale is “I will 
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act responsibly only if others do so.”  Or, reversed scored, “I will act responsibly 
even if others do not.”   
 Personal Responsibility was assessed using (1) the seven items from the 
Social Responsibility scale, and (2) one item from Schwartz’s original Ascription 
of Responsibility scale to increase internal reliability.  Seven of the eight items are 
reversed scored.  Although the reliability for the scale was still relatively low in 
the present sample (alpha = .70), the measure has often been used in research on 
prosocial behavior (Dovidio, et al., 2006).   
 Belief in a Just World for Others.  Belief in a Just World for Others scale 
consists of six items (Lipkus, et al., 1996; Sutton & Douglas, 2005).  To reduce 
the length of this section of the survey, two items that were less relevant to the 
present research were omitted from the original eight.  These were: “People treat 
each other fairly in life” and “People treat each other with the respect they 
deserve.”  The reliability coefficient of the 6-item scale was .84. 
Volunteer motivations (Appendix D). 
 Volunteer motivations were adapted from the Volunteer Motivations scale 
(Grano, et al., 2008) which consists of six motive subscales: Intrinsic 
(volunteering for personal pleasure), Integrated (identity as a volunteer), 
Identified (endorsing the value of volunteering), Introjected (feeling guilty for not 
volunteering), External (volunteering at the behest of others), and Amotivation 
(not volunteering).   
 In previous research, Intrinsic volunteer motivation assesses volunteering 
strictly for personal pleasure and has been shown to be uncorrelated with 
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volunteer intentions.  Thus, Intrinsic  motivation (alpha = .75) was measured for 
descriptive purposes only, and is not included in the conceptual model.   
 Integrated and Identified motives have been shown to be highly correlated 
in previous research and in the present study (r = .64, p < .001).  Therefore, in 
order to avoid multi-collinearity issues, the Integrated and Identified motives were 
collapsed and analyzed as one scale renamed Internal (alpha = .87).   
 People sometimes volunteer in order to earn rewards and recognition or to 
avoid the criticism of important others (Cnaan & Goldberg-Glen, 1991).  The 
External scale (Grano, et al., 2008; representative item, “I volunteer for the 
recognition I receive from others”) was modified to focus on external motivations 
with respect to religious others (e.g., “I volunteer for the rewards I will receive in 
the afterlife”).  The reliability coefficient for the modified scale was .72. 
 The remaining subscales, Introjected (alpha = .79) and Amotivation (.86) 
were included and analyzed as published.   
Intentions to Volunteer (Appendix E). 
The final endogenous variable in the path model in Study 1 was the 
intention to volunteer.  Real-world volunteer opportunities range from blood 
donation, to providing Meals on Wheels, building homes, or traveling abroad as a 
Peace Corps volunteer.  People often choose activities that “match” their own life 
experiences or interests (e.g., Stukas, Snyder, & Clary, 1999).  To sample across 
individual proclivities, the 7-point Likert-scale ratings regarding intentions to 
volunteer were specified as five different types of volunteer activities located 
away from the ASU campus (VolIntentUS).  Sample items included “Helping 
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underprivileged youths learn to read” and “Distributing reading materials to 
hospice patients” (alpha = .83).  The intention to help out-group members was 
further assessed by asking how likely participants would be to package hygiene 
items and school supplies for shipment to natural disaster victims in Israel, 
Pakistan, and Haiti (VolIntentFOR; alpha = .96).   
The correlation between the intent to volunteer for the benefit of others in 
the US and the intent to volunteer for the benefit of foreigners was quite high,  
r = .66, p < .001.  Further, as can be seen in Table 6, the correlations between 
each of the two measures and the other variables in the model did not appear to 
differ significantly.  Therefore, the two measures of Intentions to Volunteer were 
collapsed and analyzed as one measure (VolIntent; alpha = .90). 
Other measures not included in the conceptual model. 
There were several additional measures included in the survey for 
exploratory purposes, desciptive purposes, or as distractor items.  An additional 
item, “God is rejecting,” was included due to an oversight in creating the final list 
of God-concept adjectives.  These additional measures are described below. 
However, the measures were omitted from tests of the model and in the results 
reported here.   
Self and the World Section.  To avoid a response bias to self-report as 
benevolent and a strong endorsement of helping norms, there were four distractor 
measures in the Self and World Section: (1) a rank order task asking about 
favorite activities, (2)  a rank order task asking about personality traits (e.g., 
compassionate, ambitious, creative, etc), (3) a measure of participant values 
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including benevolence, power, hedonism, and so forth, and (4) a measure of the 
participant’s self-identity as being trustworthy. 
 Volunteer Section. Prior volunteer experience may be associated with 
subsequent volunteer experience, and data was collected regarding previous 
volunteer activities for descriptive purposes including: frequency of volunteer 
experience during the previous year, the type of volunteer experience, and the 
participant’s volunteer role model.   
Four items from Grano’s Volunteer Motives scale were not relevant to the 
conceptual model (discussed above), but were included in the survey as part of the 
full measure. 
 Religion Section.  Participants were also asked to rank order the adjectives 
“caring, forgiving, protecting, controlling, punishing, judging, and uninvolved” as 
descriptors of (1) how God relates with the self, and (2) how God relates with 
others.  Rosmarin et al.’s (2009) Trust/Mistrust in God scale, as well as two single 
items rating God as benevolent and God as authoritarian were also administered 
as validity checks of the BenGod and AuthGod scales.   
 Other rated measures of religiosity included: (1) beliefs about heaven and 
hell, (2) participant’s degree of spirituality, (3) Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious 
Orientation Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989), and (4) Quest Religious 
Orientation Scale (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991).  There was also a measure of 
self/other overlap with God (Sharp, et al., 2011). 
PANAS.  The International Short form of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (Thompson, 2007) was administered on the last page of the survey 
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following the collection of demographic information: age, gender, socioeconomic 
status (SES), religious group, and ethnicity.  There are many international ASU 
students and future studies are expected to include samples from other religious 
cultures (e.g., Muslim); therefore, the I-PANAS-SF was included as it has been 
shown to be a reliable measure of general mood across cultures.   
 Analytic Strategy. 
 To test the hypotheses regarding the beliefs and motivations leading to 
volunteerism, a full path analysis was constructed in four steps: (1) factor 
analyses of the God-concept adjective items including exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses; (2) computation of manifest variables and 
descriptive statistics; (3) full path analysis testing the fit of the data to the 
proposed conceptual Model 1, with post hoc re-specification of the model as 
necessary; (4) analysis of the alternative theoretical Model 2 with Benevolent God 
as a moderator of Benevolent Self and Moral Obligation and Authoritarian God as 
a moderator of Religious Obligation and BJWO; and (5) comparison of the 
goodness of fit of Models 1 and 2 where Model 1 was empirically generated on a 
post hoc basis. 
Results 
Factor analysis of God-concept adjectives. 
A factor analysis was conducted to assess the adequacy of the 30 God-
concept adjectives in describing God as benevolent and authoritarian.  The two-
fold goal in conducting the factor analyses was (1) to ascertain which items could 
be grouped together with good internal reliability, and (2) to create two God-
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concept scales, Benevolent God (BenGod) and Authoritarian God (AuthGod), 
which would serve as exogenous variables in the model. 
First, a model was tested aimed at creating the hypothesized second-order 
factor structure with Helping, Forgiving, and Protecting constituting the second-
order factor, BenGod, and Commanding, Punishing, and Just & Fair constituting 
the second-order factor, AuthGod.  As indicated in Figure 2, each of the proposed 
BenGod factors were allowed to correlate with each other (so, for example, 
Helping was specified to correlate with Forgiving); the proposed AuthGod factors 
were allowed to correlate with each other; and the second order factors, BenGod 
and AuthGod were also allowed to correlate.  This model was determined to be 
positive definite and standard errors could not be computed.  Further, truncated 
models conducted separately with the BenGod factors only and then with the 
AuthGod factors only were also found to be positive definite. 
Since the composition of the pool of items in the current study was unique, 
the next step was to identify (1) the correct number of factors and (2) exclude 
poor-fitting items prior to conducting the revised confirmatory factor analysis as 
recommended by Cabrera-Nguyen (2010).  To that end, an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was conducted using MPlus software, version 6.  As previously 
discussed, a priori assumptions grounded in previous, empirical research had been 
made (Benson & Spilka, 1973; Froese & Bader, 2010; Gorsuch, 1968; Krejci, 
1998; Kunkel, et al., 1999; Lawrence, 1997; Rosmarin, et al., 2009; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2011); that is, the items would constitute three latent variables 
comprising belief in a Benevolent God (Helping, Forgiving, and Protecting) and 
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three latent variables comprising belief in an Authoritarian God (Commanding, 
Punishing, Just & Fair) as shown in Figure 2 (Chapter 2).  Thus, the EFA was first 
conducted for the items proposed to indicate the latent variables associated with 
BenGod, and then for the items associated with AuthGod.  The MPlus default 
oblique GEOMIN rotation was used, and all 15 indicators in each of the two 
separate EFA’s were allowed to load freely on any factor with the number of 
factors unspecified.   
EFA for BenGod.  The analysis of the descriptors for BenGod revealed 
eigenvalues of 6.88 (F1), 1.57 (F2), .84 (F3) suggesting that a two-factor structure 
would provide the best fit for the data and there were two rather than three factors.   
The output from MPlus also provides fit statistics for the measurement 
model when conducting EFA.  Since factor models are likely to be rejected on the 
basis of chi square tests alone, I followed Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommend-
ation to include the comparative fit index (CFI), standardized root mean square of 
the model residuals (SRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) as evaluative goodness of fit indices.  A model is said to provide a 
good fit for the data with CFI values greater than .90 (adequate) or .95 (good fit), 
values less than .05 for SRMR, and values less than .06 for RMSEA. 
As shown in Table 1, the model fit statistics were good using the two-
factor structure, X
2 
(76) = 177, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, SRMR = .03.  As can be 
seen from the factor loadings (Table 2), the indicators for the Helping and 
Forgiving factors comprised a single first factor, with the indicators for Protecting 
God (ProtectGod) constituting the second factor. 
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Table 1.  Goodness of fit statistics for Benevolent God and for Authoritarian God 
Measurement Models using EFA in Study 1 
Analysis
b
 df Χ2 a RMSEA CFI SRMR 
1 factor EFA – BenGod 90 482 .10 .86 .07 
2 factor EFA – BenGod 76 177 .06 .97 .03 
1 factor EFA – AuthGod 90 469 .10 .80 .08 
2 factor EFA – AuthGod 76 241 .07 .91 .04 
3 factor EFA - AuthGod  63 125 .05 .97 .03 
a
All Chi-Squares are significant at p < .01. 
 
A secondary purpose of the EFA was to identify items that may fit poorly 
within the proposed conceptual categories of Helping, Forgiving, and Protecting 
(or Commanding, Punishing, and Just & Fair for AuthGod).  Poor fitting items 
can be identified by factor loadings of less than .5 and/or by high cross-loadings 
(variables loading on more than one factor with values greater than .2).   
Table 2.  Factor loadings for Benevolent God-concept measurement model (EFA) 
in Study 1 
Benevolent God 
Adjective item 
Helping 
Forgiving Protecting 
Helping .63 .18 
Compassionate .90 -.06 
Caring .81 .00 
Generous .68 .09 
Concerned .46 .22 
Forgiving .80 -.06 
Gracious .72 .14 
Accepting .62 -.02 
Merciful .56 .19 
Pardoning .39 .14 
Shielding -.01 .68 
Defending .11 .62 
Sheltering -.01 .67 
Guarding .10 .66 
Protecting .25 .50 
N = 427; Highest factor loadings for each variable are shown in bold; Items with 
low factor loadings are indicated in italics. 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the BenGod items with significant cross-
loadings or with less than ideal factor loadings were Concerned and Pardoning 
and these were omitted in the test of the full measurement model.   
EFA for AuthGod.  The analysis of the descriptors for AuthGod revealed 
eigenvalues of 5.14 (F1), 1.94 (F2), 1.18 (F3), and .96(F4), suggesting that either 
a two- or three-factor model would provide adequate fit for the data.   
Table 3.  Factor loadings for Authoritarian God-concept measurement model 
(EFA) in Study 1 
Authoritarian God  
Adjective item Commanding Punishing Just & Fair 
Strict .81 .00 -.07 
Commanding .63 .08 .15 
Controlling .60 .13 .02 
Restricting .78 -.07 -.11 
Stern .72 -.06 .04 
Master .26 .04 .47 
Punishing .41 .36 .01 
Critical .60 .05 -.08 
Angry .05 .69 -.04 
Wrathful .10 .59 .00 
Judging -.01 .71 .01 
Just .10 .00 .60 
Fair-minded .00 -.15 .67 
Unbiased -.23 -.02 .54 
Impartial -.18 .23 .24 
 
N = 427; Highest factor loadings for each variable are shown in bold; Items with 
low factor loadings are indicated in italics. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the model fit statistics were poor for the one factor 
model; adequate for the two-factor model, X
2 
(76) = 241, RMSEA = .07, CFI = 
.91, SRMR = .04, and significantly improved (ΔX2 [13] = 116, p < .001) using the 
three-factor model, X
2 
(63) = 125, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .97, SRMR = .03.  There 
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were two poor fitting items in the three-factor model identified by factor loadings 
of less than .5 and/or by high cross-loadings: Master on factors 1 and 3, and 
Impartial on factors 2 or 3, as shown in Table 3.  These items were omitted in the 
analysis of the full measurement model. 
In deciding whether to utilize the two- or three-factor solution in the CFA, 
a theoretical rather than a data-driven approach was taken.  Since the primary goal 
of the factor analysis was to identify items uniquely contributing to a single factor 
(i.e., AuthGod) with good internal consistency reliability, I decided that by 
collapsing factors 1 and 2, I could utilize all of the critical items pertaining to both 
the Commanding and the Punishing nature of God in accord with previous 
research.  This was critical because individuals’ beliefs about the dual nature of 
God have been central in theorizing about God-concepts and their corresponding 
influence on attitudes and behaviors. Researchers have measured God-concepts in 
two broad, contrasting dimensions as loving and wrathful (Froese & Bader, 2010), 
loving and controlling (Benson & Spilka, 1973), kindly and wrathful (Gorsuch, 
1968), positive and negative (Rosmarin, et al., 2009; Rosmarin, Pirutinsky, 
Pargament, & Krumrei, 2009), or nice and mean (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011).  
 Finally, it was not irrefutably clear from the goodness of fit statistics that a 
two-factor model for AuthGod was inadequate inasmuch as (1) the fit statistics for 
the two-factor model were also good, and (2) there were only three items on the 
second factor (F2) of the three-factor solution, angry, wrathful, and judging, 
making this a very short scale, and (3) a scree plot indicated that a two-factor 
model may be preferred.   
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Therefore, consistent with the literature and because the EFA was 
intended to be only a preliminary test of the items, the decision was made to 
include the indicators from both of the first two factors of the EFA for AuthGod 
as a single factor in the measurement model – thereby incorporating both the 
commanding/ controlling as well as the punishing/wrathful factors as a single 
factor, AuthGod.  This single factor would be tested again in the revised 
confirmatory factor analysis along with the BenGod items.  The remaining 
indicators from the theorized measurement model (Just, Fair, Unbiased) were 
treated as a second, albeit weak, AuthGod factor – Just & Fair God (JustGod). 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  In light of the poor fit of the data to the 
original model, the EFA’s were used to identify the problematic items associated 
with each of the two higher-order scales (i.e., BenGod and AuthGod).    
Next, based upon the results of the two EFA’s, a Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) was conducted to test the four-factor measurement model using 
the remaining indicators.  Each indicator was specified to load on only one of four 
factors, BenGod (F1), ProtectGod (F2), AuthGod (F3), or JustGod (F4) as 
suggested by the factor loadings from the EFA’s (see Table 3).  Preliminary 
analyses of the data had revealed evidence of nonnormality for some of the 
variables.  Therefore, the CFA was conducted with robust maximum likelihood 
(MLM) estimation as recommended by Byrne (2012).    
As expected, the goodness of fit statistics showed an acceptable fit of the 
data for the four-factor model, MLM X
2 
(293) = 548, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .93, 
SRMR = .06.  The factor loadings for the four factors are shown in Table 4.  
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As anticipated, BenGod (F1) was positively correlated with ProtectGod 
(F2), r = .65.  However, unexpectedly, JustGod (F4) was highly correlated with 
both Ben God, r = .65, and ProtectGod, r = .83, indicating that JustGod may have 
been mis-specified as an indicator of AuthGod. Therefore, a final model was 
tested with Helping & Forgiving (F1), Protecting (F2), and Just & Fair (F3) as 
first-order indicators of a second-order factor, BenGod, along with Commanding 
& Judging (F4) as the single indicator of AuthGod.  The goodness of fit statistics 
indicated that this model was an equally good fit for the data, MLM X
2 
(295) = 
564, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .93, SRMR = .07.   
Table 4.  Factor loadings for God-concept measurement model (CFA) in Study 1  
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 2 
 
Factor 3 
 
Factor 4 
Benevolent  
God 
(alpha = .90) 
 
Protecting  
God 
(alpha = .81) 
 
Authoritarian  
God 
(alpha = .88) 
 
Just  
God 
(alpha = .60) 
Helping .74 
 
Protecting .67 
 
Commanding .71 
 
Just .64 
Compassionate .86 
 
Guarding .73 
 
Strict .78 
 
Fair-minded .64 
Caring .85 
 
Defending .70 
 
Control .70 
 
Unbiased .45 
Generous .75 
 
Shielding .66 
 
Restricting .68 
   Forgiving .79 
 
Sheltering .66 
 
Stern .66 
   Accepting .64 
    
Punishing .69 
   Merciful .64 
    
Critical .61 
   Gracious .80 
 
   
Angry .58 
   
      
Wrathful .58 
               Judging .56       
 
However, there was no longer any obvious theoretical reason to collapse 
the three factors of BenGod into one scale – especially since JustGod had been re-
specified as an indicator of BenGod rather than AuthGod.  Additionally, each of 
the three factors may contribute uniquely to the proposed beliefs about the self 
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and the world.  For example, belief that God is helping and forgiving may be 
associated with a benevolent self-identity whereas belief that God is just may be 
associated with BJWO. 
Thus, as shown in Table 4, the four factor model relating to God’s nature 
was retained and the final adjectives serving as indicators for the latent variables 
were: Benevolent God (BenGod) – Helping, Compassionate, Caring, Generous, 
Forgiving, Gracious, Accepting, and Merciful (M = 6.20, SD = .92; alpha = .90); 
Protecting God (ProtectGod) – Protecting, Guarding, Defending, Shielding, 
Sheltering (M = 5.60, SD = 1.13; alpha = .81); Authoritarian God (AuthGod) – 
Strict, Commanding, Controlling, Restricting, Stern, Punishing, Critical, Angry, 
Wrathful, and Judging (M = 3.27, SD = 1.23; alpha = .88); and Just & Fair God 
(JustGod) – Just, Fair, Unbiased (M = 5.43, SD = 1.24; alpha = .60).  Scores for 
BenGod and AuthGod were uncorrelated, r = .02, p = .65.   
As a test of the validity of the scale scores, participants’ ratings for the 
single items “God is benevolent” and “God is authoritarian” were correlated with 
each of the four God-concepts.  Likert scale ratings for “God is benevolent” were 
positively and significantly correlated (all p’s < .001) with the BenGod, 
ProtectingGod, and JustGod scores, r = .59, .49, .36, respectively, but 
uncorrelated with the AuthGod scale, p = .61.  Participants’ ratings for the single 
item, “God is authoritarian” were also positively and significantly correlated with 
BenGod and ProtectingGod, r = .15, .27, respectively, but more highly correlated 
with the AuthGod scores, r = .58, (all p’s < .002).  Contrary to original 
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predictions but consistent with the analysis of the measurement model, “God is 
Authoritarian” was uncorrelated with the JustGod scale, p = .10.   
The indirect effects of ProtectGod and JustGod on Intentions to Volunteer 
may be interesting.  However, the purpose of the present research was to define 
and investigate the effects of Benevolent and Authoritarian God-concepts on 
Volunteerism; and the unique effects of ProtectGod or JustGod, over and above 
BenGod, had not been included in the model.  Further, the reliability of the 
JustGod scale was quite low (alpha = .60).  Therefore, the analytic strategy was to 
test the Conceptual Model using the Helping & Forgiving scale as the BenGod 
scale and the Commanding & Judging scale as the AuthGod scale.  The concepts 
ProtectGod and JustGod would be tested for exploratory purposes only after 
controlling for all other variables and significant pathways in the original 
Conceptual Model (Model 1).  If the original Conceptual Model required re-
specification, the concepts ProtectGod and JustGod would be tested for 
significance in the re-specified model. 
Descriptive statistics for model variables. 
As shown in the conceptual model in Figure 1, there were 12 proposed 
variables.  The number of items for each of these variables ranged from four (e.g., 
Moral Obligation, External Motivation) to ten (e.g., AuthGod).  Using manifest 
variables (parcels or aggregated scale scores) rather than latent variables is often 
recommended in path analyses when the ratio of number of indicators to sample 
size is relatively large (Little, Cunning-ham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2001).  This is 
because fewer parameters are estimated when manifest variables are used.  Thus, 
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indexes of model fit are often more acceptable with manifest variables, provided 
that each of the variables are unidimensional with high reliability.  In that same 
vein, the pragmatic (but more liberal) position taken by many statisticians is that 
research should aim to build replicable models based on scale scores representing 
core constructs that can be readily assessed using established measures.   
Thus, given the complexity of the research model, aggregate scale scores 
were computed for each of the measured Beliefs about God, Beliefs about Self 
and the World, Volunteer Motivations, and Intentions to Volunteer.  This was 
done by taking the average of all the items for that scale.  The aggregate score 
was computed only if more than 75% of the items for that scale had been 
answered by the individual participant.   After all scale scores were computed for 
each of the 427 participants, there was only one missing data point – an aggregate 
score missing for one participant on the scale JustGod.  This was indicated by 
entering a missing data marker score of -99 in the dataset and by using a listwise 
deletion for missing data in subsequent analyses.   
There was also one outlier in the data – a participant with scores of 1 on 
aggregate ratings for BenGod, AuthGod, JustGod, and ProtectGod.  This suggests 
that the participant may not believe in a personal God – a criterion for inclusion in 
this study.  Therefore, the participant was excluded from further analysis of the 
data.  The final data set included 425 cases with no missing data.  The means, 
standard deviations, reliability coefficients, number of items, and representative 
items for each of the manifest variables are shown in Table 5.   
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Conceptual Model in Study 1 
Variable M SD Alpha #Items Representative Item 
BenGod 6.20 .92 .90 8 God is helping/forgiving 
*
ProtectGod 5.60 1.13 .81 5 God is protecting 
AuthGod 3.27 1.23 .87 8 God is strict/punishing 
*
JustGod 5.43 1.24 .60 3 God is just/fair 
BenSelf 5.98 .92 .79 6 I am the sort of person who 
[is compassionate and 
caring] 
MoralObl 4.70 1.10 .77 4 People have a moral 
obligation to volunteer to 
help others 
RelOblig 5.30 1.23 .84 5 God commands people to 
help one another 
BJWO 3.68 1.03 .75 6 People get what they deserve 
PersResp 5.07 .86 .70 8 I would feel less bothered 
about leaving litter in a dirty 
park than in a clean one 
Internal 4.94 1.10 .87 8 I volunteer because it is part 
of who I am 
    
*
Integrated 4.73 1.32 .83 4 I volunteer because it is one 
of the ways I live my life 
    
*
Identified 5.05 1.16 .78 4 I volunteer because it’s a 
good way to contribute 
Introjected 3.80 1.47 .79 4 I volunteer because I would 
feel guilty if I did not 
volunteer  
External 3.33 1.36 .72 4 I volunteer because I will 
earn rewards in the afterlife 
Amotivation 1.84 1.17 .86 4 I don’t know; I can’t see how 
volunteering really helps 
VolIntent 4.66 1.34 .92 9 I am likely to volunteer . . . 
     
*
VolIntentUS 4.65 1.34 .83 5 Helping underprivileged 
youths learn to read 
     
*
VolIntentFOR 4.68 1.60 .96 4 I would be likely to package 
school supplies to ship to 
natural disaster victims in 
Israel 
*
Variables not included in the model 
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Correlations between all variables in the model (including the ProtectGod 
and JustGod variables) are shown in Table 6.  As can be seen there, Intentions to 
Volunteer were most highly correlated with Internal Motives, r = .47, p < .01. 
There were a number of high correlations between variables not predicted in the 
conceptual model, suggesting that the model may need to be respecified and that 
some pathways may need to be added to or omitted from the model.  For example, 
there was a significant, negative correlation between Authoritarian God and 
Benevolent Self, r = -.22, p < .01.  Moral Obligation was highly correlated with 
Internal Motives, r = .42, p < .01. Further, Authoritarian God was uncorrelated 
with both Moral Obligation, r = .06, and BJWO, r = .05; and BJWO was only 
very weakly correlated with Amotivation, r = .12, p < .05. 
Path analysis of conceptual Model 1. 
A path analysis was conducted using MPlus software, version 6. 
Preliminary analysis had revealed that all variables except BJWO were 
significantly skewed; for example, BenGod and Benevolent Self were each 
negatively skewed and Amotivation was positively skewed.  Therefore, the 
models were estimated with robust maximum likelihood (MLM) estimation to 
adjust for the nonnormality.  The significance of each parameter respecification 
was tested with the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi square as recommended by Byrne 
(2012) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).  Scaling output corrections are 
necessary when using robust MLM estimation.  The Satorro-Bentler chi-square 
difference test is computed in a three step process: (1) the scaling correction 
factor is obtained from the MPlus output, (2) the degrees of freedom and MLM 
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chi-square are adjusted by the scaling correction factor, (3) the difference in the 
re-scaled chi-squares is computed and then tested for significance.   
As in the CFA, values less than .06 for the RMSEA, greater than .95 for 
the CFI, and less than .05 for the SRMR were used to conclude there was good 
model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999).  
To begin, a model was tested specifying the structural paths among the 
manifest variables in accord with the predictions of the conceptual model (Figure 
1).  All variables within each class of variables were allowed to correlate.  So, for 
example, Internal, Introjected, External, and Amotivation Motives were allowed 
to correlate with every other variable in the Volunteer Motives class.  As shown 
in the first row of Table 7, the fit of the data to the structure of the conceptual 
model was poor, MLM X
2 
(31) = 228, RMSEA = .12, CFI = .80, SRMR = .09.   
Post hoc model modifications are typically required in the analysis of 
structural equations (Byrne, 2012) and were, therefore, performed in an attempt to 
develop a better fitting model.  The goal was to specify the most parsimonious 
model with both good theoretical justification for each estimated parameter and 
with good fit statistics.  To that end, I followed the recommendation of 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) to add one new path at a time, checking for an 
incremental improvement in fit statistics, until a good fit of the model to the data 
has been reached; then, all non-significant paths were to be omitted.   
In order to determine which paths to add, I consulted the modification 
indices provided in the MPlus output.  Modification indices are estimates of the 
incremental reduction in chi-square that could be achieved by the addition of 
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specified pathways.  However, paths suggested by the modification indices were 
added only if doing so was reasonable within the conceptual framework as 
discussed below.  (So, for example, a suggested path leading from Amotivation 
back to Benevolent Self was not added to the model.)   
Table 7.  Sequential Chi-square difference tests for Model 1 in Study 1 
Analysis df 
Chi-
Square
a
 
RMSE
A CFI SRMR ΔX2  
Conceptual Model 31 228 .12 .80 .09 
 Add paths: 
      Internal Motive regressed 
on Moral Oblig 30 184 .11 .84 .07 43.90
*** 
Amotivation regressed on 
Benevolent Self 29 116 .08 .91 .06 56.02
***
 
Extern Motive regressed 
on Personal Respons 28 91 .07 .94 .05 24.52
***
 
Benevolent Self 
regressed on AuthGod 27 75 .07 .95 .04 17.55
***
 
BJWO regressed on 
BenGod 26 70 .06 .96 .04 5.47
**
 
Omit non-significant 
paths: 
      Moral Oblig regressed  
on AuthGod 27 71 .06 .95 .04 1.77 
BJWO regressed  
on AuthGod 28 72 .06 .96 .05 1.38 
Amotivation regressed  
on BJWO 29 73 .06 .96 .05 0.01 
Volunteer intentions 
regressed on Introjected 30 74 .06 .96 .05 1.33 
AuthGod uncorrelated 
with BenGod 31 75 .06 .96 .05 0.11 
Omit Variable BJWO: 
      BJWO regressed on 
BenGod – Final Model 25 68 .06 .95 .05 6.69** 
a
All Chi-Squares are significant at p < .01. 
*** 
p < .005; 
** 
 p < .025 
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Thus, my strategy was to add, one at a time, the paths with the greatest 
estimated reduction in chi-square until the model provided a good fit for the data 
as discussed below.  The incremental improvement in chi-square for each added 
pathway can be seen in Table 7.  The final model provided a good fit for the data, 
MLM X
2 
(25) = 68, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .95, SRMR = .05.  
Added pathways. 
A total of five paths were added to the model: (1) Internal Motives 
regressed on Moral Obligation, (2) Amotivation regressed on Benevolent Self, (3) 
External Motives regressed on Personal Responsibility, (4) Benevolent Self 
regressed on AuthGod, and (5) Belief in a Just World for Others was regressed on 
BenGod (this path was omitted later in the analyses as BJWO did not predict any 
Volunteer Motive).   
Three paths pertained to beliefs regarding the Self and the World.  First, 
Moral Obligation was added as a significant predictor of Internal Motives.  This is 
consistent with research in moral decision making (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007) 
showing that moral judgments are grounded in both social norms (external to the 
self) and personal intuitions (internalized values).   
Second, increased scores on Benevolent Self led to a reduction in 
Amotivation.  This, too, is understandable.  Since Benevolent Self was a strong 
positive predictor of Internal Motives and, thereby, Intentions to Volunteer, it 
follows that scores on Benevolent Self would be negatively associated with the 
inverse – Amotivation (i.e., not being motivated to volunteer).   
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Third, Personal Obligation was a significant, negative predictor of 
External Motives.  Similar to the inverse effects of Benevolent Self on Internal 
Motives and Amotivation, this path seems to model the inverse of the predicted 
positive path from Personal Responsibility to Internal Motives.  High scores on 
Personal Responsibility reflect an attitude that one should help (positive effect on 
Internal Motive) even when others do not (negative effect on External Motive). 
In the original conceptual model, Benevolent God was predicted to be the 
only God-concept to be positively associated with belief in a Benevolent Self.  In 
the final model, a negative pathway from Authoritarian God to Benevolent Self 
was added.  If people see God as punishing, wrathful, and commanding, they may 
be less likely to see themselves as forgiving, compassionate, and gracious.  This is 
consistent with studies showing that opinions of the self are mirrored by opinions 
about God (Epley, et al., 2009; Roberts, 1989). 
Omitted pathways. 
After the addition of the significant pathways discussed above, four non-
significant hypothesized paths between classes of variables were deleted from the 
model: (1) Moral Obligation was not predicted by belief in AuthGod, (2) Belief in 
a Just World for Others (BJWO) was not predicted by belief in AuthGod, (3) 
Amotivation was not predicted by BJWO, and (4) Intentions to Volunteer were 
not predicted by Introjected Motivation.  Also, because BenGod and AuthGod 
were uncorrelated (standardized coefficient -.01, p = .78) this parameter was 
constrained to zero.  Finally, because BJWO had no effect on any of the measured 
Volunteer Motives, one of the parameters that had been added earlier regressing 
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BJWO on Benevolent God, β = -.11, and all the related within-class correlations 
(e.g., BJWO with Benevolent Self) were deleted from the model.   
In contrast to previous research (Pichon & Saroglou, 2009), BJWO was a 
non-significant predictor of Amotivation in this student sample.  The negative 
correlation between BJWO and Personal Responsibility (Table 6; r = -.40) 
suggests that BJWO is associated with less Personal Responsibility and this may 
represent the pathway by which BJWO is inversely related to volunteerism. 
Two additional pathways were omitted in the post hoc analysis.  
Introjected Motivation was not a significant predictor of Intentions to Volunteer.  
Introjected Motivation assesses feelings of guilt for not volunteering, and a simple 
explanation is that guilt does not motivate religious people to help unrelated 
others.  As can be seen in Table 6, Introjected Motivation was highly correlated 
with both Internal Motivation, r = .47, p < .01, and External Motivation, r = .40, p 
< .01; and yet less highly correlated with Volunteer Intentions, r = .27, p < .01. 
Thus, it may also be that feelings of guilt for not volunteering come into play only 
via the other motivational pathways. 
Finally, scores on Authoritarian God were uncorrelated with a Moral 
Obligation to help but, notably, significantly and positively correlated with 
Religious Obligation, r = .36, p < .01.  This lends support to previous research 
showing that people differentiate between moral and religious obligations (Cohen, 
et al., 2005) and that God-concepts may be important in making that distinction 
(Morewedge & Clear, 2008).  
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The fit of the data to the final model was good, MLM X
2 
(25) = 68, 
RMSEA = .06, CFI = .95, SRMR = .05, as shown in the final row of Table 7.  
Overall, the model accounted for 23% of the variance in Intentions to Volunteer.  
The standardized coefficients for the final model are depicted in Figure 4.   
Figure 4. Significant Path Coefficients in the Structural Model 1 in Study 1 
 
 
 
Standardized coefficients for the significant paths between four classes of 
variables in the final model: Beliefs about God, Beliefs about the Self and the 
World, Volunteer Motivations, and Intentions to Volunteer, X
2 
(25) = 68, RMSEA 
= .06, CFI = .95, SRMR = .05.  All p’s < .001 except Personal Responsibility 
leading to Internal Motivations, p = .05.  Four paths were added to the conceptual 
model: (1) Authoritarian God  Benevolent Self, (2) Benevolent Self  
Amotivation, (3) Moral Obligation  Internal Motives, and (4) Personal 
Responsibility  External Motives.  Four paths were deleted from the conceptual 
model: (1) Authoritarian God  BJWO, (2) Authoritarian God  Moral 
Obligation, (3) BJWO on Amotivation, and (4) Introjected  Volunteer 
Intentions.  Correlations between variables within each class are omitted for 
clarity and can be seen in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Correlations between variables within each class in Model 1 in Study 1 
Correlation by Variable Class 
Standardized 
Coefficients    p-value 
Beliefs about Self & the World 
  Benevolent Self with Moral Obligation .28 <.001 
Benevolent Self with Religious Obligation .11 .025 
Benevolent Self with Personal Responsibility .31 <.001 
Moral Obligation with Religious Obligation .23 <.001 
Moral Obligation with Personal Responsibility .11 .018 
Religious Obligation with Personal Responsibility .15 .002 
Volunteer Motives  
  Internal Motive with Introjected Motive .39 <.001 
Internal Motive with External Motive .20 <.001 
Internal Motive with Amotivation -.05 .407 
Introjected Motive with External Motive .31 <.001 
Introjected Motive with Amotivation .16 <.001 
External Motive with Amotivation .24 <.001 
 
The indirect effects related to all significant paths in the model are shown 
in Table 9.  The sum of the indirect effects, also sometimes called the total 
indirect (or total) effect, is the sum of the indirect effects that a predictor variable 
has on an endogenous variable via mediating variables.  The indirect effects and 
their sums for BenGod and AuthGod on Volunteer Intentions are presented in 
Table 9 and discussed in the following section. 
Effects of Belief in a Benevolent God.  There are multiple pathways that 
highlight the relation between belief in a benevolent God and intentions to 
volunteer (sum of the indirect effects, β = .09, p < .001). As predicted (H1), high 
scores on BenGod were associated with high scores on Benevolent Self which, in 
turn, was associated with high scores on Internal Motivation (the strongest 
motivational predictor of intentions to volunteer in this study), β = .02, p = .01.  
Consistent with H1, high scores on Benevolent Self were also associated with low 
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scores on Amotivation (the disinclination to volunteer), with a positive total effect 
of BenGod  Benevolent Self  Amotivation  Volunteer Intentions, β = .02, p 
< .001.  Taken together, these pathways highlight the importance of belief in a 
Benevolent God and a Benevolent Self in relation to Intentions to Volunteer. 
Table 9.  Standardized indirect effects depicted in the model from Benevolent and 
Authoritarian God to Volunteer Intentions (the final endogenous variable) 
Path 
    Indirect 
Effects (IE) SE 
 
IE/SE 
Benevolent God     
BenGod  BenSelf  Internal  
 Volunteer Int .02 .01 2.80**  
BenGod  BenSelf  Amotivation 
 Volunteer Int .02 .01 3.12**  
BenGod  Moral Oblig  Internal 
 Volunteer Int .02 .01 3.43***  
BenGod  Religious Oblig External  
 Volunteer Int .02 .01 2.43**  
BenGod  Personal Respons  Internal  
 Volunteer Int .01 .00 1.71  
BenGod  Personal Respons  External  
 Volunteer Int -.01 .00 -2.07*  
BenGod  Personal Respons  Amotive  
 Volunteer Int .01 .00 2.33**  
Sum of the Indirect Effects 
BenGod  Volunteer Intentions  .09 .02 6.12***  
Authoritarian God 
  
  
AuthGod  BenSelf  Internal  
 Volunteer Int -.01 .01 -2.81**  
AuthGod  BenSelf  Amotivation  
 Volunteer Int -.01 .00 -3.01***  
AuthGod  Religious Oblig  External  
 Volunteer Int .02 .01 2.49**  
AuthGod  Personal Respons  Internal  
 Volunteer Int -.01 .00 -1.76  
AuthGod  Personal Respons  External  
 Volunteer Int .00 .00 1.83  
AuthGod  Personal Repons  Amotive  
 Volunteer Int -.01 .00 -2.10*  
Sum of the Indirect Effects  
AuthGod  Volunteer Intentions  -.02 .01 -1.66  
***
p < .001; 
**
 p < .025; 
*
  p < .05 
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As hypothesized (H2), BenGod was positively associated with Moral 
Obligation which, in turn, was associated with higher scores on Introjected 
Motivation (feeling guilty for not helping), β = .07, p < .001 (Table 10).   
Although Introjected Motivation was positively correlated with Volunteer 
Motivations, it was not a significant predictor of Volunteer Intentions after 
controlling for Internal and External Motivations.  Instead, it was discovered that 
Moral Obligation was also significantly and positively associated with Internal 
Motives, β = .31.  Further, the BenGod  Moral Obligation  Internal 
Motivations  Volunteer Intentions was the only significant path for BenGod via 
Moral Obligation, β = .02, p < .001 (Table 9).   
As hypothesized (H3), Benevolent God was also associated with increased 
perceived Religious Obligation to help which was, in turn, associated with 
External Motivation, leading to Volunteer Intentions, β = .02, p = .02.  As 
predicted by self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) and in accord with 
previous research (Grano, et al., 2008), External Motivation was less likely to 
increase Volunteer Intentions relative to Internal Motivations, β = .13 versus  
β = .40, respectively. 
In accord with hypothesis (H4), BenGod was positively associated with 
Volunteer Intentions via a positive effect on Personal Responsibility and a 
negative effect on Amotivation, β = .01, p = .02.  However, the indirect effect of 
BenGod on Intentions to Volunteer via Personal Responsibility and Internal 
Motives was not significant, β = .01, p = .09.  A second path had been added in 
the re-specification of effects of belief in a Benevolent God – the direct and 
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negative effect of Personal Responsibility on External Motivation, β = -.23 
(Figure 4).  The indirect effect of the BenGod  Personal Responsibility  
External Motives  Volunteer Intentions path was significant, β = -.01, p = .04. 
Effects of Belief in an Authoritarian God.  Unlike belief in a benevolent 
God, the sum of the indirect effects of belief in an authoritarian God on Volunteer 
Intentions was not significant, β = -.02, p = .10.  Contrary to hypothesis (H5), the 
path from Authoritarian God to Moral Obligation was not significant, β = .08, p = 
.18.  Even when considering the zero-order correlations, r = .06, AuthGod and 
Moral Obligation were not significantly correlated, suggesting the effect was not 
simply being partialled out in the structure model. 
However, as hypothesized (H6), belief in an AuthGod was associated with 
a perceived Religious Obligation to help which, in turn, was positively associated 
with External Motivations and Intentions to Volunteer, β = .02 p = .01. 
Further, as predicted (H7), AuthGod was significantly and negatively 
associated with Personal Responsibility.  That is, believing that God is 
commanding and punishing seems to be associated with feelings that an 
individual will help only if others also help which, in turn, is both negatively 
associated with Internal Motivation and positively associated with Amotivation.   
However, whereas the indirect effect for the path AuthGod  Personal 
Responsibility  Amotivation  Volunteer Intentions path was significant, β =  
-.01, p = .04, the path via Internal Motivations was not, β = -.01, p = .08.   
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Table 10.   Sums of the standardized indirect effects for paths depicted in the final  
model between the exogenous variables BenGod and AuthGod and Volunteer 
Motives in Study 1 
Path  (IE)    SE IE/SE 
Indirect paths to Internal Motives 
   BenGod  BenSelf  Internal Motives .05 .02 2.87** 
BenGod  Moral Oblig  Internal Motives .06 .02 3.73*** 
BenGod  Personal Respons  Internal Motives .02 .01 1.76 
Indirect effects BenGod to Internal Motives .13 .02 6.13
***
 
    
AuthGod  BenSelf  Internal Motives -.03 .01 -2.94** 
AuthGod  Personal Respons  Internal Motives -.01 .01 -1.83 
Indirect effects AuthGod to Internal Motives -.04 .01 -3.88
***
 
    
Indirect paths to Introjected Motives 
   BenGod  Moral Oblig  Introjected Motives .07 .02 4.03*** 
Indirect effects BenGod to Introjected Motives .07 .02 4.03
***
 
    
AuthGod  Moral Oblig  Introjected Motives .00 .00 .00 
Indirect effects AuthGod to Introjected Motives .00 .00 .00 
    
Indirect paths to External Motives 
  
  
BenGod  Religious Oblig  External Motives .13 .03 5.18*** 
BenGod  Personal Respons  External Motives -.04 .01 -3.08** 
Indirect effects BenGod to External Motives .09 .03 3.08
**
 
    
AuthGod  Religious Oblig  External Motives .12 .02 5.73*** 
AuthGod  Personal Respons External Motives .03 .01 2.37** 
Indirect effects AuthGod to External Motives .15 .02 6.31
***
 
    
Indirect paths to Amotivation 
   BenGod  BenSelf  Amotivation -.12 .03 -4.79*** 
BenGod  Personal Respons  Amotivation -.05 .02 -2.95** 
Indirect effects BenGod to Amotivation -.16 .03 -5.16
***
 
    
AuthGod  BenSelf  Amotivation .08 .02 3.98*** 
AuthGod  Personal Respons  Amotivation .03 .01 2.45** 
Indirect effects AuthGod to Amotivation .11 .03 4.47
***
 
***
p < .001; 
**
 p < .025; 
*
 p < .05 
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Finally, the path from Personal Responsibility to External Motives had 
been added in the re-specification; however, the AuthGod  Personal 
Responsibility  External Motivation  Volunteer Intentions path was not 
significant, β = .00, p = .07.  In sum, there appears to be little evidence that 
AuthGod predicts Volunteer Intentions via Personal Responsibility. 
Contrary to the study hypothesis (H8), belief in an authoritarian God was 
not significantly associated with belief in a just world for others (BJWO), β = .07, 
p = .17.  The indirect effect of the path from AuthGod  BJWO  Amotivation 
 Volunteer Intentions was also non-significant, β = .00, p = .52.  Moreover, 
despite previous research to the contrary (e.g., Pichon & Saroglou, 2009), BJWO 
was not directly associated with any of the Volunteer Motives.  Thus, the manifest 
variable BJWO was omitted from the re-specified model shown in Figure 4. 
Finally, although not hypothesized, AuthGod was associated with an 
indirect negative effect on Volunteer Intentions via Benevolent Self and Internal 
Motivations, β = -.01, p = .01, as well as via Benevolent Self and Amotivation,  
β = -.01, p < .001.  This is in contrast to the positive effects of Benevolent God 
and is consistent with the zero-order correlations shown in Table 6, where it can 
be seen that BenGod was positively associated with Volunteer Intentions (r = .16,  
p = .001), whereas AuthGod and Volunteer Intentions were not (r = -.00, p = .95). 
In conclusion, the positive indirect effects of AuthGod via Religious 
Obligation appear to be negated by the negative effects via Benevolent Self. 
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Tests of moderation (Model 2) 
 Next, an alternative Model 2 was tested which posits that BenGod and 
AuthGod are moderators of the effects of particular beliefs about the self and the 
world on Volunteer Motives.  To that end, all the relevant manifest variables in 
the data set were first centered, and then interaction terms were calculated for the 
hypothesized interactions: (1) BenGod interacts with Benevolent Self to affect 
Internal Motives, (2) BenGod interacts with Moral Obligation to affect Introjected 
Motives, and (3) AuthGod interacts with Religious Obligations to affect External 
Motives.  A fourth interaction, AuthGod interacts with BJWO to affect 
Amotivation was not included inasmuch as BJWO was omitted from the final, re-
specified model.  The re-specified Model 1 had included another important path, 
Moral Obligation leading to Internal Motivation.  Therefore, the interaction of 
BenGod and Moral Obligation to affect Internal Motives was also tested.  
 In order to test the effects of the interaction terms, it was also necessary to 
re-specify Model 2 so that the endogenous variables Benevolent Self, Moral 
Obligation, and Religious Obligation served as exogenous variables.  Further, 
where necessary, significant regression paths in Model 1 were re-specified as 
correlations in Model 2 (e.g., Benevolent Self was no longer regressed on 
AuthGod and, instead, allowed to correlate with AuthGod). 
 The data had been analyzed with MLM in Model 1 to correct for non-
normality which required a scaling correction to test the chi-square difference in 
sequential models.  However, since all the variables had been centered in Model 
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2, ML (Maximum Likelihood) was utilized, and the significance of the chi-square 
difference was calculated without the need for the Satorro-Bentler correction.     
Figure 5.  Significant Path Coefficients and Correlations in the Interaction Model 
2 in Study 1 
 
 
 
Standardized coefficients for the model adding the interaction term (BenGod x 
Benevolent Self) with significant paths between four classes of variables in the 
final model: Beliefs about God, Beliefs about the Self and the World, Volunteer 
Motivations, and Intentions to Volunteer, X
2 
(31) = 87, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .94, 
SRMR = .05.  All p’s < .001 except Interaction term and Personal Responsibility 
leading to Internal Motivations, p = .04 and .03, respectively.  Some correlations 
between variables within each class are omitted for clarity. 
  
As had been done in analyzing Model 1, the four interaction terms (with 
their related correlations) were tested sequentially in four separate steps.  In the 
path analysis model, the interaction of BenGod with Benevolent Self as a 
predictor of Internal Motives was significant, β = .09, p = .04, and the effect of 
BenGod on Internal Motives was no longer significant, p = .20.  However, the 
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overall fit of the model (Figure 5) was slightly degraded with the additional 
degrees of freedom, X
2 
(31) = 87, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .94, SRMR = .05; Δ X2 (6) 
= 16, p < .025.  
The interaction of BenGod with Moral Obligation as a predictor of 
Introjected Motives was non-significant, β = .05, p = .27.   
The interaction of BenGod with Moral Obligation as a predictor of 
Internal Motives was also non-significant, β = .04, p = .43.   
Finally, the interaction of AuthGod with Religious Obligation as a 
predictor of External Motives was not significant, β= .03, p = .44. Figure 5 
presents the expanded model with the single interaction term, Benevolent God by 
Benevolent Self, added. 
 Decomposition of BenGod x Benevolent Self Interaction.  The single 
significant interaction, BenGod with Benevolent Self, was further probed in 
SPSS.  In testing the interaction effect, centered scores for all variables (from the 
MPlus data file) were used.  The interaction term was re-created in SPSS by 
multiplying the centered scores for BenGod by the centered Benevolent Self 
scores.  Since Moral Obligation was also an important predictor of Internal 
Motivations, a regression model was run which included Moral Obligation.   
Outside of the full structural model, the BenGod by Benevolent Self 
interaction effect, β = -.09, was not a significant predictor of Internal Motivation, 
p = .056. The full model accounted for 21% of the variance in frequency of 
volunteer scores, F (4, 420) = 27.34, p < .001. Above and beyond the main effects 
of Benevolent Self, however, the interaction term accounted for less than 1% of 
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the variance in Internal Motivation.  Notably, the effect of BenGod was also non- 
significant in the SPSS model, p = .23, with Moral Obligation included in the 
model. 
Nevertheless, to further probe the interaction effect on Internal Motivation 
in the full model, simple slopes were calculated following procedures outlined in 
Aiken and West (1991).  When centered BenGod scores were the predictor, the 
equation for predicted Internal Motivation scores was Ŷi = .166(Xi) + 4.877.  To 
illustrate the interaction effects, predicted Internal Motivation scores were 
generated for individuals who were: (a) one standard deviation below the mean, 
(b) at the mean, and (c) one standard deviation above the mean on the BenGod 
scale. As can be seen in Figure 6, the positive relation between Benevolent Self 
and Internal Motivation was much stronger among participants who were high in 
belief in a benevolent God.  In other words, belief in a benevolent God augments 
the relation between Benevolent Self and Internal Motivations to Volunteer. 
Figure 6.  Plot of Interaction of Benevolent God by Benevolent Self on Internal 
Motivation to volunteer in Study 1 (N = 425). 
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Post hoc tests. 
Exploratory tests for possible interactions.  Certain interaction terms had 
been hypothesized as an alternative to the conceptual model.  However, because 
MPlus modification indices do not specify the addition of interaction terms, an 
exploratory analysis was conducted using SPSS software using centered variables, 
and testing three sets of additional, potential interactions: (1) the interaction of 
BenGod by AuthGod on Beliefs about Self & the World, (2) the interaction of 
God-concept by Beliefs about Self & the World on Motivations, and (3) the 
interaction of the God-concept by each Motivation on Intentions to Volunteer.   
Tests of the effects of the AuthGod by BenGod interaction indicated there 
were no significant interaction effects on Benevolent Self, Religious Obligation, 
Personal Responsibility, and BJWO.  However, the interaction was significant for 
Moral Obligation, β = -.12, p = .01.  An analysis of the simple slopes revealed that 
those who were high in both AuthGod and BenGod were equally likely to report a 
perceived Moral Obligation to help others. Those who were one standard 
deviation below the mean for BenGod but high in AuthGod were also likely to 
perceive a moral obligation.  However, those who were low in both BenGod and 
AuthGod were the least likely to perceive a Moral Obligation to volunteer.   
As can be seen in Table 11, the next set of exploratory analyses revealed 
that there were several significant interactions involving the God-concept by 
Belief about Self & World on Volunteer Motivations.  For example, as previously 
discussed, the effect of a Benevolent Self on Internal Motivations to volunteer 
may depend upon one’s concept of God, such that a Benevolent Self-identity is 
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strengthened by belief in a Benevolent God-concept but – as suggested by the 
analyses here – may also be weakened by belief in an Authoritarian God. 
Table 11. Exploratory analysis of the interactions of God-concepts by Beliefs on 
Volunteer Motivations 
 
 
Internal Introjected External  Amotivation 
Interaction  
Term β p β p β p β p 
BenGod x 
BenSelf
 
.15
a
 .00
*** 
.09 .09 .11 .03
*
 .04 .37 
MoralOblig .06
a
 .17 .06
a
 .22 -.01 .86 -.08 .12 
ReligOblig .03 .49 .05 .27 .03 .59 -.01 .92 
PersResp .06 .25 .03 .60 .07 .17 .20 .00
***
 
BJWO -.07 .18 -.06 .22 .02 .71 -.01 .86 
AuthGod x 
BenSelf -.17 .00
***
 -.11 .03
*
 -.13 .01
**
 -.16 .00
***
 
MoralOblig -.10 .03
* 
-.06 .17 -.03 .50 .02 .62 
ReligOblig .06 .25 -.08 .13 -.01
a
 .88 -.11 .03
*
 
PersResp -.07 .17 -.06 .24 -.03 .60 -.13 .00
***
 
BJWO -.02 .63 -.13 .01
** 
-.01 .87 .07
a
 .13 
***
p < .001; 
** 
p < .025; 
* 
p < .05 
a 
Hypothesized interactions discussed in preceding section  
 
In tests of the Conceptual Model, low scores on Personal Responsibility 
were associated with high scores on Amotivation.  Thus, it is also interesting to 
note here that this association may depend on concepts of God.  Simple slopes 
analysis of the effects of the AuthGod by Personal Responsibility interaction on 
Amotivation revealed that those who were low in Personal Responsibility 
(individuals who are inclined to make excuses for not helping) and who were also 
high in belief in an Authoritarian God were significantly less likely to intend to 
volunteer (i.e., higher amotivation scores).  Conversely, those who were low in 
Personal Responsibility but were high in belief in a Benevolent God were more 
likely to be motivated to volunteer (i.e., lower amotivation scores). 
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There were also three significant interactions of Beliefs by Motivations on 
Volunteer Intentions: BenGod by Internal Motives (β = .10, p = .03), BenGod by 
Amotivation (β = -.13, p = .01), and AuthGod by Amotivation (β = .15, p < .01). 
Figure 7.  Simple slopes for the interaction of God-concept by Personal 
Responsibility on Amotivation 
 
These analyses were conducted for exploratory purposes only and should 
be interpreted with caution since (1) no hypotheses had been made concerning 
these interactions, and (2) multiple tests are likely to uncover significance for at 
least some effects.  My strategy was to test these interactions again in Study 2.  
The effects of Protecting and Just God.  Because the variables 
ProtectGod and JustGod had not been specified in the original model, the decision 
was made to add these variables for exploratory purposes only, and only after 
testing and re-specifying the original Conceptual Model.  In the first post hoc test, 
ProtectGod was allowed to correlate with BenGod, r = .51, p < .001, and 
AuthGod, r = .21, p < .001, and there was a significant and direct effect of 
ProtectGod on Religious Obligation only, β = .21, p = .001.  ProtectGod  
Religious Obligation  External Motives  Intentions to Volunteer provided a 
significant pathway in the model, with the estimated indirect effect = .01, p = .05.  
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However, the addition of ProtectGod did not significantly improve the model, 
MLM X
2 (33) = 82, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .95, SRMR = .05, Δ X2 (8) = 13.68, p > 
.10.  
 Since JustGod was expected to be associated with BJWO, a variable that 
had been omitted from the final model, and because the reliability coefficient for 
JustGod was relatively low (alpha = .60) and with very low loadings on one of the 
three items, post hoc tests involving JustGod were not performed. 
Discussion 
A number of important conclusions can be derived from the final model.  
First, consistent with self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000) and previous 
research (Gagné, 2003; Grano, et al., 2008), internal (i.e., intrinsic) motivation 
was a stronger predictor of intentions to volunteer for secular causes than was 
external (i.e., extrinsic) motivation.  Feeling guilty about not helping was a non-
significant predictor of intentions to volunteer after controlling for internal and 
external motives.   
A benevolent self-identity as well as the belief that one has a moral 
obligation to help appears to be a potent predictor of internal motivation to 
volunteer.  Notably, moral obligation was only modestly correlated with religious 
obligation.  Moreover, perceived religious obligations (obeying God’s command-
ments) were associated with volunteer intentions only via External Motives (e.g., 
rewards in the afterlife or to avoid criticism by the religious group).  Amotivation 
was also an important predictor of Intentions to Volunteer such that Benevolent 
Self and Personal Responsibility were negatively associated with Amotivation. 
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An authoritarian God-concept also contributed to Intentions to Volunteer 
via a perceived religious obligation.  Unexpectedly, AuthGod was not linked with 
a moral obligation to help, and was negatively associated with thinking of the self 
as benevolent or with feeling a sense of personal responsibility – volunteering 
even when others do not.  Thus, whereas religious obligation likely contributes to 
intentions to volunteer, these obligations appear to be offset by a lack of personal 
responsibility.  After all, belief in an authoritarian God corresponds with belief in 
a system of rewards and punishments and personal accountability.  Christians may 
employ these beliefs in evaluating the circumstances of others with the conclusion 
that help is unwarranted.  
In sum, belief in a benevolent God appears to make a greater contribution 
to Intentions to Volunteer for secular causes (with five positive pathways and only 
one negative path) relative to belief in an authoritarian God (with one positive 
path and three negative pathways in the model). 
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Chapter 4 
STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE EFFECTS OF BENEVOLENT 
AND AUTHORITARIAN GOD-CONCEPTS ON INTENTIONS TO 
VOLUNTEER AND VOLUNTEER BEHAVIOR 
 
 Concepts of God may originate through projections of an individual’s own 
thoughts (e.g., Epley, et al., 2009; Freud, 1961), interactions with religious 
leaders, parents, and important others (Beck & McDonald, 2004; Dickie, et al., 
2006; Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1992), religious narratives, personal experiences, or 
all of these (Boyer, 2001). As observed in Study 1, an individual’s concept of God 
can have positive and negative effects on diverse social attitudes.  However, it is 
unclear whether God-concepts are a consequence of one’s personal pre-
dispositions or whether God-concepts shape one’s self-identity, values and beliefs 
about the world.  The best way to investigate the causal direction of God-concepts 
and beliefs and motivations on volunteerism is by experimental manipulation. 
 God-concepts often change over a person’s lifespan (Dickie, et al., 2006; 
Fowler, 1996; Rizzuto, 1979) in contexts like conversion, traumatic events (Aten, 
et al., 2008), personal religious experiences (James, 1902/2002), and through 
social interactions (e.g., new romantic partners). Consequently, priming various 
concepts of God has been successful in previous studies, eliciting different 
attitudinal and behavioral responses (Barrett, 1998; Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett 
& VanOrman, 1996; Bushman, et al., 2007; Johnson, et al., 2011).   
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 Thus, the purpose of Study 2 was twofold: (1) to examine the effect of 
activating concepts of God as benevolent and authoritarian on beliefs about the 
self and the world, volunteer motivations, and intentions to volunteer; and (2) to 
examine the effects of activating concepts of God as benevolent and authoritarian 
using a behavioral measure of volunteerism.   
In week 1, participants first completed a pre-test measure of the 11 key 
variables (BenGod, AuthGod, Benevolent Self, Moral Obligation, Religious 
Obligation, Personal Responsibility, BJWO, and Internal, Introjected, or External 
or Motives and Amotivation) from the Benevolence Survey used in Study 1.  In 
week 2, participants returned to the lab and were randomly assigned to one of four 
priming conditions, Benevolent God, Authoritarian God, Religious Control, or 
Secular Control.  After completing a bogus memory test and the Benevolence 
Survey for a second time, participants also completed the two dependent 
variables: (1) the Intentions to Volunteer section of the Benevolence Survey, and 
(2) a behavioral measure which entailed whether or not they would voluntarily 
return to the lab (without compensation) at the same time the following week to 
package hygiene items and school supplies for children in Haiti.   
Hypotheses 
 Despite the fact that several paths in the model had been re-specified in 
Study 1, the hypotheses in Study 2 were generated based on the original 
conceptual model.  This was done for two reasons.  First, the results of an 
experimental study (Study 2) may not exactly duplicate the correlational data in 
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Study 1.  Similarly, Study 1 measures chronic beliefs, whereas Study 2 was 
designed to assess temporary beliefs activated by priming.   
The following results were expected: 
H13: Activating belief in a Benevolent God through explicit scriptural 
references will result in higher scores regarding Benevolent Self-identity, higher 
scores on Internal Motivation to volunteer, stronger Volunteer Intentions, and a 
greater likelihood of Volunteer Sign-ups relative to the Religious Control, Secular 
Control, and Authoritarian God conditions. 
H14: Activating belief in a Benevolent God through explicit scriptural 
references will result in higher scores on Moral Obligation, Introjected Motivation 
and Volunteer Intentions, leading to a greater likelihood of Volunteer Sign-ups 
relative to the two Control and the Authoritarian God conditions. 
H15: Activating belief in an Authoritarian God through explicit scriptural 
references will result in higher scores on Religious Obligation, External 
Motivation, Volunteer Intentions, and a greater likelihood of Volunteer Sign-ups 
relative to the two Control (but not the Benevolent God) conditions. 
H16: Activating belief in an Authoritarian God through explicit scriptural 
references will result in lower scores on Personal Responsibility, higher scores on 
amotivation, lower scores on Volunteer Intentions, and less likelihood of 
Volunteer Sign-ups relative to the two Control and the Benevolent God 
conditions.   
H17: Activating belief in an Authoritarian God through explicit scriptural 
references will result in higher scores on Belief in a Just World for Others and 
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Amotivation, leading to lower scores on Volunteer Intentions, and less likelihood 
of Volunteer Sign-ups relative to the two Control and Benevolent God conditions.  
Methods: Study 2 
Participants. 
 Participants were 335 psychology undergraduates recruited from the 
Introductory Psychology general survey at the beginning of the Fall 2011 and 
Spring 2012 semesters.  Participants were recruited based on their religious 
affiliation as being either Catholic or non-Catholic Christian.  All participants had 
also reported belief in God with a rating of three or more (“God might exist”) on a 
five point multiple-choice question, as in Study 1.  Participants earned partial 
credit in fulfillment of course requirements.   
There were 140 Catholics and 195 non-Catholic Christians (163 males and 
172 females), with religious affiliation and gender of participants randomly 
distributed across the four conditions (Table 12).  Participants reported being 
Euro-American (66%), Hispanic (17%), Black (7%), Asian-American (6%), or 
other (4%) ethnicity.  There were no significant differences across the four groups 
regarding social class (X
2
 [12] = 10.45, p = .57). 
Table 12.  Religious affliliation and gender of participants in Study 2 
 
 
Catholic 
 
Christian 
 
Total 
 
Grand 
Condition M F 
 
M F 
 
M F 
 
Total 
Authoritarian 22 32 
 
29 26 
 
51 58 
 
109 
Benevolent 22 20 
 
31 40 
 
53 60 
 
113 
Religion Control 12 11 
 
19 17 
 
31 28 
 
59 
Secular Control 8 13 
 
20 13 
 
28 26 
 
54 
Total 64 76   99 96   163 172   335 
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Procedure. 
 The study was administered across three weeks.  All participants self-
scheduled for the same date and time for Week 1 (T1) and Week 2 (T2).  
Participants arrived in the lab during Week 1 and completed the online version of 
the Benevolence Survey from Study 1, except that the questions regarding 
Intentions to Volunteer (DV1) were not included.  Of the 335 participants, 13 did 
not participate in the Pre-test survey at T1. 
Participants returned to the lab at the same date and time during Week 2 
for a study ostensibly testing whether answering questions of a personal nature 
interferes with memory for learned quotations.  The “learned quotations” were 
presented in booklets consisting of nine quotations from one of the four priming 
conditions along with a photo on the first page of the book of either an angry God 
(AuthGod condition), a dove (BenGod condition), or a question mark (Religious 
and Secular Control conditions).  The quotations were drawn primarily from the 
Biblical Psalms and Proverbs and were pre-tested in a different sample of 
Catholic and non-Catholic Christian psychology undergraduates (n = 212) for 
relevance to an authoritarian or benevolent God or as being neutral.   
As can be seen in Table 12, on average, 69% rated the AuthGod scriptures 
as being reminders of an authoritarian God (e.g., “The Lord rained down burning 
sulfur on Sodom and Gomorrah – and fire out of heaven”) and 83% rated the 
BenGod scriptures as being reminders of a benevolent God (e.g., “The Lord will 
be like soft rain falling on a mown field, like showers watering the earth”).   
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Table 13.  Primes for AuthGod and BenGod conditions with percentage of 
participants’ ratings of scriptures as authoritarian or benevolent 
 
% Quotation Source 
   
AuthGod Authoritarian God  
75 The LORD burned with anger against his own people; He 
was disgusted with those who belonged to him 
Ps 
106:40 
64 The face of the Lord is against those who do evil, to cut 
off the memory of them from the earth 
Ps 34:16 
72 The Lord rained down burning sulfur on Sodom and 
Gomorrah – and fire out of heaven 
Gen 
19:24 
66 It is God who judges: He brings down one, and exalts 
another 
Ps 75:7 
54 Justice and judgment are the habitation of God’s throne Ps 89:14 
71 God judges the righteous, and is angry with the wicked 
every day 
Ps 7:11 
80 God will punish them with everlasting destruction and 
shut them out from the presence of the Lord 
2 Th 1:9 
65 The wrath of God is being revealed . . . against all 
godlessness 
Ro 1:18 
73 The voice of the Lord strikes with flashes of lightening, 
shakes the desert, and strips the forests bare 
Ps 29:7-
9 
   
BenGod Benevolent God  
85 The Lord is gracious and full of compassion, slow to 
anger, and rich in love 
Ps 145:8 
86 God is our refuge and our strength, an ever present help in 
times of trouble 
Ps 46:1 
86 The Lord gives strength to his people; the Lord blesses his 
people with peace 
Ps 29:10 
87 The Lord satisfies the thirsty and fills the hungry with 
good things 
Ps 107:9 
82 The Lord will be like soft rain falling on a mown field, 
like showers watering the earth 
Ps 72:6 
80 The steadfast love of the Lord never ceases; his mercies 
never come to an end 
Lam 
3:22 
74 The Lord is my shepherd, I shall lack nothing Ps 23:1 
85 The Lord is my strength and my shield; my heart trusts in 
him, and I am helped 
Ps 28:7 
80 For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn 
the world, but to save the world through him 
Jn 3:17 
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Table 14.  Primes for Religion Control and Secular Control conditions with 
percentage of participants’ ratings of scriptures (Religion Control) as neither 
authoritarian nor benevolent 
 
% Quotation Source 
Neutral Religion Control - wisdom of the Bible 
 62 A quarrelsome wife is like a constant dripping on a rainy 
day Pr 27:15 
61 Like a gold ring in a pig’s snout is a beautiful woman who 
shows no discretion Pr 11:22 
67 Better to meet a bear robbed of her cubs than a fool in his 
folly Pr 17:12 
54 It is not good to have zeal without knowledge, nor to be 
hasty and miss the way Pr 19:2 
57 A word aptly spoken is like apples of gold in settings of 
silver Pr 25:11 
66 Ants are creatures of little strength, yet they store up their 
food in the summer. Pr 30:25 
71 How useless to spread a net in full view of all the birds! Pr 1:17 
51 Wise men store up knowledge, but the mouth of a fool 
invites ruin Pr 10:14 
   
 Secular Control - tips for organizing a desk 
  Throw out those things that are not needed, like old papers, 
or torn scraps of paper, or even an outdated picture. 
  Decide what are your most important and most-used items. 
  Items such as pencils, pens, scissors, and important 
documents, should be placed in a drawer that is within easy 
reach (or, in the case of pens and pencils, in a cup). 
  You should keep an in/out tray, clock, lamp and a calendar 
on your desk. 
  Place loose papers in a desk box, and mark them by using a 
tiny dot or paper clip on the top so you'll remember to go 
back to them. 
  Papers that are not being worked on can be put in a binder or 
a folder. 
  Do not store information in envelopes, as it creates clutter in 
your desk and in your mind. 
  Things needed more often, can be placed in a drawer instead 
of being left on top. 
   Develop a filing system so you know where to put things 
like receipts, and so you can find things easily without 
disturbing everything else.   
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As shown in Table 14, 61% rated the Religion Control scriptures as being 
neither authoritarian nor benevolent.  The Secular Control statements regarding 
organizing a desk were created for this study and were not pre-tested, but were 
assumed to be unrelated to religion or concepts of God (e.g., “You should keep an 
in/out tray, clock, lamp, and a calendar on your desk”).   
It is noteworthy that, although the items in the AuthGod prime clearly 
portrayed God as punishing, only about 69% of the participants rated these verses 
as reminding them of an authoritarian God and about 18% rated these verses as 
being neither benevolent nor authoritarian.  These ratings are in contrast to the 
83% average rating for the benevolence verses as being reminders of a benevolent 
God.  This suggests there may be reactance to characterizations of God as 
authoritarian – even if those characterizations are scriptural. 
After a four minute study period of reading and memorizing the condition-
relevant quotations, participants again completed the online version of the 
Benevolence Survey including the questions regarding Volunteer Intentions 
(DV1).  A bogus memory test was also administered along with several distractor 
questions asking about the efficacy of the participant’s memory.    
The online instructions then informed the participants that the study had 
ended but asked whether the participant would be willing to sign up for a 
volunteer activity scheduled to take place at that same time and day of the 
following week (DV2).  Participants were informed that the activity would 
involve packaging hygiene items and school supplies to ship to children in Haiti.  
Participants were also informed that the activity was entirely voluntary and they 
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would not receive any additional credit or compensation for returning the 
following week to volunteer.  Participants could respond (1) not interested, (2) 
would like to help but cannot, or (3) yes, I will return next week to help.   
Participants who did not sign up were dismissed and instructed to take a 
blue flyer (with a list of other ASU volunteer opportunities); and participants who 
did volunteer were instructed to take a green flyer with a reminder notice of the 
dates and times of the volunteer activity as they left.   
During Week 3, volunteers returned and packaged approximately 500 care 
packages that were eventually shipped to orphanages in Haiti and Mexico.  
However, due to experimenter error, an unknown number of volunteers failed to 
sign in and register their attendance.  Therefore, the measure of actual volunteer 
attendance was dropped as a third DV in the study. 
Measures. 
 All measures were completed in the lab using the online version of the 
Benevolence Survey (from Study 1).  As in Study 1, all items were rated on a 1 to 
7 Likert scale and were randomized within each section. 
 Pre-test (T1). 
 BenGod and AuthGod.  As in Study 1, and as shown in Appendix A, there 
were 30 items pertaining to the concepts of Benevolent God (BenGod; alpha = 
.91) and Authoritarian God (AuthGod; alpha = .90).  On a separate page of the 
survey, participants were also asked to what extent they think “God is Benevolent 
(helping, forgiving, protecting)” and “God is Authoritarian (commanding, just, 
punishing).”    
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Benevolent Self.  As in Study 1, participants rated the extent to which a list 
of six adjectives characterizing a benevolent person pertained to them: caring, 
compassionate, accepting of others, generous, and helpful (Appendix B). The 
reliability coefficient for the Benevolent Self scale (T1) was .79. 
Moral Obligation. As in Study 1, participants rated their perceived moral 
obligation to volunteer to help others (Appendix C).  The reliability coefficient for 
the Moral Obligation scale (T1) was .77. 
 Religious Obligation.  As in Study 1, participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which they believed they had a religious obligation to help others 
(Appendix C), alpha (T1) = .81 
 Personal Responsibility.  As in Study 1, Personal Responsibility was 
assessed using seven items of the Prosocial Personality Battery subscale 
(Appendix C), alpha (T1) = .54. 
 Belief in a Just World for Others.  As in Study 1, BJWO was assessed 
using the BJWO scale (Lipkus, et al., 1996; Sutton & Douglas, 2005) as listed in 
Appendix C (alpha [T1] = .67).   
 Volunteer Motivations.  As in Study 1 (Appendix D), volunteer 
motivations were assessed using the Internal, Introjected Motives, External 
Motives, and Amotivation scales (Grano, et al., 2008).  The reliability coefficients 
(T1) were .87, .81, .75, and .84, respectively. 
Intentions to Volunteer.  As in Study 1, the first dependent variable was 
Intentions to Volunteer (Appendix E; alpha = .83).  Sample items included 
“Helping underprivileged youths learn to read” and “Distributing reading 
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materials to hospice patients.”  The intention to help out-group members was 
further assessed by asking how likely participants would be to package hygiene 
items and school supplies for shipment to natural disaster victims in Israel, 
Pakistan, and Haiti (alpha = .96).   
Other measures. In order to differentiate the surveys presented at T1 and 
T2, there were several additional measures included in the Pre-test (T1) survey as 
distractor items.  Participants were asked: (1) to rate themselves as being an 
athlete, musician, techie, etc., (2) ten questions regarding how well they could 
remember things, (3) an intolerance of ambiguity scale (Budner, 1962), and (4) 
religiosity and beliefs about heaven and hell, etc.  The frequency of volunteer 
experience during the previous year, the type of volunteer experience, and the 
participant’s volunteer role model were also assessed.  The results of these 
measures were omitted from the results reported here.   
 Post-test (T2). 
 The Benevolence Survey administered at T2 included all the variables 
from Study 1 and the Pre-Test: BenGod, AuthGod, Benevolent Self, Moral 
Obligation, Religious Obligation, Personal Responsibility, BJWO, Internal 
Motives, Introjected Motives, External Motives, and Amotivation.  As before, all 
items were rated on a 1 to 7 Likert scale.   
 Also as in Study 1, participants rated their Volunteer Intentions (Appendix 
E). Other measures included the bogus memory test and five questions asking 
participants to rate their memory.  The PANAS-X was also administered. 
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 The order of presentation of the Benevolence Survey at T2 was: (1) 
Beliefs about Self and the World, (2) Volunteer Motives, (3) PANAS-X, (4) 
religious beliefs including the extent to which “God is benevolent” and “God is 
authoritarian,” (5) 30 adjectives describing Beliefs about the nature of God, (6) 
the bogus memory test, (7) demographics, (8) Volunteer Intentions, and (9) the 
opportunity to sign up as a volunteer for the coming week. 
 Analytic Strategy.  The data were analyzed in five steps: (1) computation 
of scale scores, descriptive statistics, and reliability coefficients for the items at 
T1 and T2, (2) a manipulation check of the effectiveness of the primes, (3) tests of 
the main effects of the prime on Volunteer Intentions and Volunteer Behavior, (4) 
tests of the main effect of the primes on the five Beliefs about Self and the World 
and the four Volunteer Motives, and (5) a test of the interaction of BenGod by 
Benevolent Self on Internal Motives as suggested by the results of Study 1. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for variables in T1 and T2. 
 Aggregate scale scores were computed for each of the measured Beliefs 
about God, Beliefs about Self and the World, Volunteer Motivations at both T1 
and T2 and for Volunteer Intentions at T2.  This was done by taking the average 
of all the items for that scale.  The aggregate score for each scale was computed 
only if more than 75% of the items for that scale had been answered by the 
individual participant.   
The items comprising the BenGod and AuthGod scales were the eight 
items pertaining to the BenGod scale and the ten items pertaining to the AuthGod 
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scale as in Study 1.  The BenGod scale and the single “Benevolent God” item 
were correlated, r = .66, p < .001.  The AuthGod scale and the single “Authori-
tarian God” item were correlated, r = .58, p < .001.  In contrast to Study 1, the 
BenGod and AuthGod scales were significantly correlated, r = .23, p < .001. 
Table 15.  Descriptive statistics in Study 2, across all groups, for variables in the 
conceptual model at T1 and T2 
 
 
Pre-test (T1) 
 
Post-test (T2) 
 
Mean 
Diff  
 
N = 320 
 
N = 333 
 
 
M SD Alpha 
 
M SD Alpha 
 
T1-T2 
Benevolent  
God 6.37 .77 .91 
 
6.36 .73 .90 
 
-.01 
Authoritarian 
God 3.48 1.37 .90 
 
3.56 1.38 .91 
 
.08 
Benevolent  
Self 6.19 .76 .79 
 
6.11 .50 .78 
 
-.08
* 
Moral 
Obligation 5.03 1.06 .78 
 
5.03 1.07 .82 
 
.00 
Religious 
Obligation 5.05 1.37 .81 
 
5.16 1.31 .82 
 
.11
*
 
Personal 
Responsibility 4.96 .77 .54 
 
5.05 .87 .73 
 
.09
**
 
Belief in Just 
World Others 3.78 .90 .67 
 
3.98 .89 .71 
 
.21
***
 
Internal 
Motivations 5.01 1.03 .87 
 
5.08 1.07 .91 
 
.07 
Introjected 
Motivations 3.71 1.36 .81 
 
3.88 1.33 .85 
 
.17
**
 
External 
Motivations 3.35 1.25 .75 
 
3.69 1.24 .78 
 
.34
***
 
 
Amotivation 1.75 .90 .84 
 
1.81 1.03 .91 
 
.06 
Volunteer 
Intentions  n/a  n/a n/a   4.46 1.37 .94       n/a 
***
p < .001; 
**
p < .025; 
*
p < .05 
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The means, standard deviations, and reliability coefficients for each of the 
independent variables, across all groups, at T1 and T2, and the dependent variable 
at T2, are shown in Table 15 (above).  
Preliminary tests of normality showed that there was one outlier in the 
data at T1 – a participant with extreme scores on five of the eleven variables.  A 
second participant in the Religious Control condition had failed to complete either 
of the two DV’s at T2.  These two participants were excluded from further 
analysis of the data.  The final data set included 320 cases at T1 and 333 cases at 
T2 (13 participants had not reported to the lab during Week 1, but were allowed to 
participate in the priming task and Benevolence Survey at T2).  Of these, there 
were seven cases with missing data including four participants who failed to 
complete 75% of the items on the Volunteer Intentions scale. 
Manipulation check. 
As a manipulation check, four 4 x 2 mixed MANOVA’s were performed. 
The between-subjects factor was God-concept prime condition (BenGod, 
AuthGod, Religion Control, or Secular Control) and the within-subjects factor 
was occasion (Pre-test [T1] vs. Post-test [T2] scores). The four dependent 
variables were: (1) the single item, God is Benevolent, (2) the single item, God is 
authoritarian, (3) the aggregate score on the BenGod scale, and (4) the aggregate 
score on the AuthGod scale.   
Although the significance tests of MANOVA assume a multivariate 
normal distribution, modest violations are acceptable except in the case of outliers 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Thus, Mahalanobis distances were first calculated 
  100 
across the four T2 variables and compared with the critical value of 18.47.  Two 
additional outliers were identified (Mahalanobis = 21.36 and 30.41) and, 
therefore, also omitted from subsequent analyses. 
There were no significant interactions between condition and time of test 
for either of the two Benevolent God-concept measures: BenGod scale, Wilks 
Lambda = .996, F (3, 310) = .46, p = .71 and the “God is Benevolent” item, Wilks 
Lambda = .997, F (3, 309) = .34, p = .80.  Further, there were no main effects of 
time for the two variables: BenGod scale, F (1, 310) = .05, p = .83; “God is 
Benevolent” item, F (1, 309) = .33, p = .56.  There were also no main effects 
between conditions for the two variables, BenGod scale, F (3, 310) = .37, p = .77; 
“God is Benevolent” rating, F (3, 309) = .99, p = .40, indicating that the BenGod 
prime appears to have had little or no effect as can be seen in the comparison of 
pre- and post-test scores in Table 16.  Notably, the scores for the Benevolent God 
single item and the BenGod scale were nearly at ceiling (7 points).   
There was not a significant condition by time interaction for the AuthGod 
scale, Wilks Lambda = .983, F (3, 310) = 1.74, p = .16.  There was no main effect 
of condition, F (3, 310) = .42, p = .74, indicating that belief in an Authoritarian 
God was also fairly constant across conditions and, indeed, the estimated 
marginal means for AuthGod were lower than the other three groups: AuthGod, 
EMM = 3.45, SE = .13; BenGod, EMM = 3.52, SE = .13; ReligionPrime, EMM = 
3.69, SE = .18; and SecularPrime, EMM = 3.51, SE = .19.  There was also no 
main effect of time across the four conditions, F (1, 310) = 2.38, p = .12. 
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However, there was a significant condition by time interaction for the 
“God is Authoritarian” single item rating, Wilks Lambda = .967, F (3, 309) = 
3.51, p = .02, partial eta squared, .03.  
Table 16.  Differences in scores for BenGod scale, single item “God is 
benevolent,” AuthGod scale, and single item “God is Authoritarian,” by 
condition, in Study 2 
 
 
BenGod 
Prime 
AuthGod 
Prime 
Religion 
Control 
Secular 
Control 
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
BenGod 
(Scale) Pre 
6.39 .75 6.41 .75 6.31 .79 6.38 .89 
BenGod 
(Scale) Post 
6.39 .71 6.36 .74 6.26 .74 6.45 .72 
Δ BenGod .00  -.05  -.04  .06  
         
“Benevolent” 
Item - Pre 
6.29 1.11 6.41 .98 6.22 1.37 6.49 1.14 
“Benevolent” 
Item - Post 
6.29 .99 6.50 .85 6.29 .98 6.45 .89 
Δ Benevolent .00  .09  .07  -.04  
         
AuthGod 
(Scale) Pre 
3.52 1.32 3.33 1.28 3.68 1.57 3.47 1.43 
AuthGod 
(Scale) Post 
3.51 1.37 3.56 1.38 3.70 1.45 3.54 1.44 
Δ AuthGod -.01  .23**  .02  .07  
         
“Authoritarian” 
Item - Pre 
4.31 2.13 4.10 2.16 4.18 2.30 4.14 2.37 
“Authoritarian” 
Item - Post 
4.09 1.96 4.47 2.14 4.49 2.10 4.29 2.20 
Δ Authoritarian -.22
† 
  .37
**
   .31
††
   .14   
 
** 
p < .025; 
† 
p = .10; 
†† 
p = .12 
 
A subsequent examination of the means and data plots indicated that the 
“Authoritarian” item had increased between T1 and T2 in the AuthGodPrime 
condition and decreased between T1 and T2 in the BenGodPrime condition.  
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A set of individual, paired-samples t-tests was conducted comparing 
scores from T1 and T2 for each of the four sets of variables (AuthGod scale, 
BenGod scale, God is Authoritarian single item, and God is Benevolent single 
item) in each of the four conditions (BenGodPrime, AuthGodPrime, Religion 
Control, and Secular Control) and the results are reported in Table 15.  As can be 
seen there, the change in scores on the two measures of AuthGod from T1 to T2 
was significant only in the AuthGodPrime condition, t (100) = 2.64, p = .01 and  
t (100) = 2.43, p = .02, respectively. 
Main effects of primes on Volunteer Intentions and Behavior. 
Although the results of the manipulation check had indicated that there 
were no significant differences between groups in ratings of either BenGod or 
AuthGod at T2, the AuthGodPrime condition did appear to have some effect.  
Moreover, there may have been implicit changes in beliefs about the self and the 
world, volunteer motives, or volunteer intentions not reflected in explicit ratings 
of God’s character.  Therefore, the next step was to investigate the proposed main 
effects of the BenGod Prime and AuthGod Prime on Volunteer Intentions and 
Volunteer Sign-ups.   
Volunteer Intentions.   
It was predicted (H13 and H14) that activating thoughts of a benevolent 
God would indirectly increase Volunteer Intentions (BenGodPrime condition, M 
= 4.56, SD = 1.44) relative to the AuthGodPrime, M = 4.46, SD = 1.21, Religion 
Control, M = 4.51, SD = 1.46, and Secular Control M = 4.30, SD = 1.40, 
conditions.  Contrary to the hypothesis, there was not a significant difference in 
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Volunteer Intentions across conditions, F (3, 319) = .46, p = .71.  Three 
independent samples t-tests with BenGodPrime as the reference group also 
confirmed that there were no significant differences in Volunteer Intentions as a 
result of reminders of a Benevolent God (lowest p = .27; BenGodPrime vs. 
Secular Prime).   
It was also predicted that activating thoughts of an authoritarian God 
would have both a positive (H15) indirect effect (via Religious Obligation and 
External Motives) and a negative (H16 and H17) effect (via Personal 
Responsibility and Amotivation) – thus, no effect – on Volunteer Intentions 
relative to the BenGodPrime, Religion Control, and Secular Control conditions.  
A second set of independent t-tests with AuthGodPrime as the reference group 
confirmed there were no significant differences in Volunteer Intentions relative to 
any of the other groups (lowest p = .47; AuthGodPrime vs. Secular Prime). 
It is possible, however, that Volunteer Intentions were predicted by pre-
existing beliefs regarding God’s nature.  Therefore, a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis was performed with Volunteer Intentions as the dependent 
variable and pre-test (T1) scores for BenGod entered at Step 1, condition (dummy 
coded) at Step 2, and interaction terms for T1 by condition at Step 3.  The full 
model for the BenGod terms was significant, accounting for 6% of the variance,  
F (7, 302) = 3.60, p = .001.  The interactions were not significant and there was 
(as expected) no main effect of condition.  However, pre-test scores for BenGod 
was a significant predictor in the full model, β = .46, p < .001.   
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A second regression model with AuthGod, condition (dummy coded), and 
the interaction terms for T1 by condition as the predictor variables was not 
significant, p = .59.  This supports the finding in Study 1 that AuthGod appears to 
have a net, null effect on Volunteerism. 
Volunteer Sign-ups.   
It was predicted that reminders of a benevolent God would increase 
Volunteer Sign-ups and reminders of an authoritarian God would have a net of no 
effect on Volunteer Sign-ups relative to Control.  To investigate the proposed 
main effect of BenGodPrime on Volunteer Sign-ups, a Chi Square test for 
independence was performed for the binary dependent variable (Volunteer Sign-
up).  There were no significant differences in registering to attend the volunteer 
activity across the four groups: BenGodPrime, 24%; AuthGodPrime, 23%; 
Religion Control, 25%; and Secular Control, 21% signed up to volunteer, X
2 
(3) = 
.20, p = .98.   
Finally, a logistic regression was conducted to ascertain whether T1 scores 
on BenGod or T1 scores on AuthGod were able to predict Volunteer SignUps 
over and above condition, or time by condition interaction.  The model was not a 
good fit for the data, p = .43. 
Main Effects of the primes on Beliefs and Motives. 
To test the effects of the God-concept primes on (a) the five types of 
beliefs and (b) the four types of volunteer motivations, a series of mixed 
MANOVA’s was conducted. The between-subjects factor was Condition 
(BenGodPrime, AuthGodPrime, Religion Control, or Secular Control) and the 
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within-subjects factor was the occasion (pre-test [T1] vs. post-test [T2] scores). 
For beliefs, the dependent variables were the vector of scores on the measures of 
Benevolent Self, Moral Obligation, Religious Obligation, Personal Responsibility, 
and Belief in a Just World. For motives, the dependent variables were the vector 
of scores on Internal, Introjected, and External Motivations and Amotivation.   
(H13) BenGodPrime  Benevolent Self Internal Motives.  Contrary to 
the hypothesis, the estimated marginal means for Benevolent Self were actually 
lower for participants in the BenGodPrime condition, M = 6.12, SE = .07, relative 
to the AuthGodPrime, M = 6.18, SE = .07, Religion Control, M = 6.10, SE = .09, 
or Secular Control, M = 6.22, SE = .10, conditions.  However, a mixed MANOVA 
revealed there was not a significant interaction of condition by time across the 
four priming conditions, Wilks Lambda = .981, F (3, 310) = 2.00, p = .11. There 
were no significant differences between the conditions, p = .74, and Benevolent 
Self scores did not significantly differ from T1 to T2 across all groups, p = .18.  
Analyzed individually, paired-samples t-tests showed that there was a significant 
decrease in Benevolent Self scores from T1 to T2 in the AuthGodPrime condition 
only, t (100) = 3.19, p = .002. 
Also contrary to hypothesis (H13), the estimated marginal means for 
Internal Motivation did not differ significantly for the BenGodPrime condition,  
M = 5.04, SE = .10, relative to the AuthGodPrime, M = 4.99, SE = .10, Religion 
Control, M = 5.19, SE = .13, or Secular Control, M = 5.07, SE = .14.  A mixed 
MANOVA revealed that there was not a significant condition by time interaction 
across the four conditions, Wilks Lambda = .983, F (3, 310) = 1.80, p = .15. 
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There were no significant differences between the conditions, p = .69, and 
Internal Motives did not significantly differ from T1 to T2 across all groups,  
F (3, 310) = 3.25, p = .07.  Individual paired-samples t-tests for each condition 
showed that the difference in Internal Motivation scores at T1 and T2 had 
increased significantly in the BenGodPrime condition only, t (108) = 2.87,  
p = .005. 
 Figure 8 graphically illustrates the difference in scores on Benevolent Self 
and Internal Motives (two variables in a primary pathway in the conceptual 
model) for the two priming and the two control conditions.   
Figure 8.  Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Benevolent 
Self and Internal Motives. 
 
 (H14) BenGodPrime  Moral Obligation Introjected Motives.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the estimated marginal means for Moral Obligation 
did not differ for participants in the BenGodPrime condition, M = 5.03, SE = .10, 
relative to the AuthGodPrime, M = 5.04, SE = .10, Religion Control, M = 5.07, SE 
= .13, or Secular Control, M = 5.08, SE = .14, conditions.  A mixed MANOVA 
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showed there was not a significant condition by time interaction across the four 
conditions, Wilks Lambda = .988, F (3, 310) = 1.21, p = .31. There were no 
significant differences between the conditions, p = .99, and Moral Obligation did 
not significantly differ from T1 to T2 across all groups, p = .77.  When analyzed 
individually in paired-samples t-tests, there were again no significant differences 
from T1 to T2, as shown in Figure 9.   
Figure 9.  Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Moral 
Obligation and Introjected Motives. 
 
 
 
Consistent with the hypothesis (H14), the estimated marginal means for 
Introjected Motivation were higher in the BenGodPrime condition, M = 3.94,  
SE = .12, relative to the AuthGodPrime, M = 3.59, SE = .12, Religion Control, M 
= 3.91, SE = .17, or Secular Control, M = 3.76, SE = .18, conditions.  However, a 
mixed MANOVA revealed that there was no condition by time interaction, Wilks 
Lambda = .996, F (3, 310) = .44, p = .72, and the differences between the 
conditions were not significant, p = .19.  However, there was a main effect of 
time, F (1, 310) = 8.70, p = .003.  Subsequent paired-samples t-tests showed that 
  108 
the difference in Introjected Motivation scores at T1 and T2 did not change 
significantly in the BenGodPrime condition as predicted, p = .36.  Instead, the 
Secular Control group unexpectedly increased in Introjected Motives, p = .025.  
Thus, in accord with the final model in Study 1, AuthGodPrime had no 
effect on Moral Obligation or Introjected Motives.  Although BenGod was found 
to be a significant predictor of Moral Obligation in the final model in Study 1, the 
BenGodPrime condition also had little or no effect on Moral Obligation.  The 
BenGodPrime condition also had no significant effect on Introjected Motives. 
 (H15) AuthGodPrime  Religious Obligation External Motives.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the estimated marginal means for Religious 
Obligation did not differ for participants in the AuthGodPrime condition, M = 
5.13, SE = .13, relative to the BenGodPrime, M = 5.14, SE = .12, Religion 
Control, M = 5.05, SE = .17, or Secular Control, M = 5.06, SE = .18, conditions.  
A mixed MANOVA confirmed there was not a significant condition by time 
interaction, Wilks Lambda = .987, F (3, 309) = 1.40, p = .24. There were no 
significant differences between the conditions, p = .97.   
Although the differences from T1 to T2 did not reach conventional levels 
of significance, F (1, 309) = 3.44, p = .065, subsequent paired-samples t-tests 
within each group showed that there was a significant increase in Religious 
Obligation from T1 to T2 in the BenGodPrime condition, t (107) = 3.27, p = .001.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the difference in Religious Obligation from 
T1 to T2 in the AuthGodPrime condition was not significant, p = .96. 
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Also contrary to hypothesis (H15), the estimated marginal means for 
External Motivation were similar for the AuthGodPrime, M = 3.54, SE = .11, 
BenGodPrime, M = 3.63, SE = .10, Religion Control, M = 3.37, SE = .15, and 
Secular Control, M = 3.31, SE = .17, conditions.  A mixed MANOVA revealed 
there was not a significant condition by time interaction, Wilks Lambda = .995,  
F (3, 309) = .54, p = .66. There were no significant differences between the 
conditions, p = .31.  Unexpectedly, however, the differences from T1 to T2 were 
significant across all conditions for External Motives, F(1, 309) = 34.83, p < .001.  
Moreover, subsequent paired-samples t-tests showed that the difference in 
External Motivation scores at T1 and T2 increased significantly in three of the 
four conditions (including the Secular Control), p’s ranging from .001 to .07. 
Figure 10.  Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Religious 
Obligation and External Motives. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 (above) shows the difference in scores on Religious Obligation 
and External Motives in each of the four conditions.   
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 (H16) AuthGodPrime  Personal Responsbility Amotviation.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the estimated marginal means for Personal 
Responsibility did not differ for participants in the AuthGodPrime condition, M = 
5.05, SE = .07, relative to the BenGodPrime, M = 4.95, SE = .07, Religion 
Control, M = 5.03, SE = .10, or Secular Control, M = 5.15, SE = .11, conditions.  
A mixed MANOVA showed there was not a significant condition by time 
interaction, Wilks Lambda = .992, F (3, 309) = .82, p = .49. There were no 
significant differences between the conditions, p = .47.  However, there was a 
main effect of time, F (1, 309) = 5.78, p = .02.  Subsequent paired-samples t-tests 
showed that the increase in Personal Responsibility at T1 and T2 was statistically 
significant in the AuthGodPrime condition only, t (107) = 2.66, p = .009.  This is 
in contrast to the decrease that would have been predicted by the final model in 
Study 1.  
Contrary to the hypothesis (H16), the estimated marginal means for 
Amotivation were about the same for the AuthGodPrime condition,  M = 1.67,  
SE = .08, BenGodPrime, M = 1.83, SE = .08, Religion Control, M = 1.68, SE = 
.11, and Secular Control, M = 1.78, SE = .12, conditions.  A mixed MANOVA 
revealed there was not a significant condition by time interaction regarding 
Amotivation, Wilks Lambda =.995, F(3, 310) = .55, p = .65. There were no 
significant differences between the conditions, p = .51, and no differences across 
the four groups from T1 to T2, p = .88.  Subsequent paired-samples t-tests 
confirmed that the difference in Amotivation scores at T1 and T2 did not differ 
significantly in the AuthGodPrime condition, p = 47, as hypothesized. 
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Figure 11 shows the difference in scores on Personal Responsibility and 
Amotivation in each of the four conditions.   
Figure 11.  Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for Personal 
Responsibility and Amotivation. 
 
 
 
 (H17) AuthGodPrime  BJWO Amotivation.  Contrary to the 
hypothesis, the estimated marginal means for BJWO were only slightly higher for 
participants in the AuthGodPrime condition, M = 3.92, SE = .08, relative to the 
BenGodPrime, M = 3.94, SE = .08, Religion Control, M = 3.82, SE = .11, or 
Secular Control, M = 3.76, SE = .12, conditions.  A mixed MANOVA showed 
there was not a significant condition by time interaction regarding Amotivation, 
Wilks Lambda = .939, F(3, 310) = .94, p = .42. There were no significant 
differences between the conditions, p = .55.  However, across the four groups 
there was a significant differences in scores on BJWO from T1 to T2, F (1, 310) = 
21.35, p < .001.  Subsequent paired-samples t-tests showed that the increase in 
BJWO at T1 and T2 was statistically significant in each of the religious prime 
conditions, AuthGodPrime, t (100) = 3.42, p = .001, BenGodPrime, t (108) = 
2.36, p = .02, and the Religion Control, t (54) = 3.13, p = .003; (p = .39 for 
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Secular Control). As discussed above, there were no significant differences in 
Amotivation. 
Figure 12.  Differences between Pre- and Post-test, by condition, for BJWO and 
Amotivation. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 (above) shows the difference in scores on BJWO and (again) 
Amotivation in each of the four conditions.   
Tests of moderation 
The test of the structural equation model carried out as part of Study 1 
yielded an interaction of BenGod by Benevolent Self on Internal Motives. To test 
this interaction in Study 2, a hierarchical regression model was used to predict 
Internal Motivations at T2.   
Specifically, to test whether the BenGodPrime interacts with the pre-test 
scores for Benevolent Self to affect changes in Internal Motivation Post-test (T2), 
Internal Motivation scores were regressed on:  
Step 1 - Pre-test Internal Motivation scores [change in motivation] 
Step 2 - Pre-test Benevolent Self scores [pre-existing beliefs]  
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Step 3 - Three dummy variables contrasting (a) AuthGodPrime with 
Secular Control, (b) BenGodPrime with Secular Control, and (c) Religion 
Control with Secular Control [prime condition] 
Step 4 - Three interaction terms representing Pre-test Benevolent Self 
scores by each of the three dummy variables entered in Step 3 [interaction 
of BenGodPrime with Benevolent Self] 
In the final model, the interaction was not significant, p = .89.  Thus, the 
interaction of BenGod by Benevolent Self on Internal Motives in Study 1 is not 
supported by the analysis of the data in Study 2.  
Post hoc tests  
Tests of the Conceptual Model in Study 2.   
The effects of priming benevolent and authoritarian God concepts were 
modest or null in Study 2, and it may be that an individual’s chronic beliefs are 
more predictive of downstream beliefs and behaviors than are temporary 
reminders of different aspects of God’s nature.  Therefore, to simultaneously (1) 
test the relations between chronic beliefs about God’s nature and volunteer 
intentions and behavior, and (2) replicate the structural model in Study 1, the full 
data set – without regard to condition – was submitted to a path analysis using the 
parameters specified in the final path model in Study 1 (including all correlations 
and omitting all non-significant pathways from the conceptual model).   
In specifying the Study 2 model, Post-test (T2) scores on the following 
variables were used: BenGod, AuthGod, Benevolent Self-identity, Moral 
Obligation, Religious Obligation, Personal Responsibility, BJWO, Internal 
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Motives, Introjected Motives, External Motives, Amotivation, and Intentions to 
Volunteer.  (Note that BJWO was also specified in the model in Study 2 but was 
again found to be non-significant.)  Additionally, in this model, the 13
th
 variable 
was the categorical variable, Volunteer Sign-up, coded 0 for “no” and 1 for “yes.” 
Figure 13. Path Model from Study 1 with data from Study 2  
 
Comparison of the paths and path coefficients from Study 1 and Study 2.  Path 
coefficients for Study 2 are indicated by parentheses.  The dotted line indicates 
the single path added in Study 2.  The grey lines indicate non-significant paths in 
Study 2.  Goodness of fit statistics for the re-specified model in Study 2 were X
2 
(32) = 52, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .98, SRMR = .04.  All variables were allowed to 
correlate within each class but are not shown in the model for clarity.   
 
Evaluation of the goodness of fit statistics showed that adding the path, 
Moral Obligation  Amotivation would improve the model fit.  However, the 
two paths that had been added to the conceptual model in the post hoc re-
specification in Study 1 (Authoritarian God  Benevolent Self and Personal 
Responsibility  External Motivation) were non-significant in Study 2.   
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Table 17.  Standardized indirect effects for paths depicted in the final model 
between the exogenous variable BenGod and the endogenous variables: Motives, 
Volunteer Intentions, and Volunteer Sign-Up, in Study 2 
 
 
Path from BenGod  
 
Motives 
Volunteer 
Intentions 
Volunteer 
Sign-Up 
 IE IE/SE
a 
IE IE/SE
a
 IE IE/SE
a
 
BenSelf  Internal  .07 3.35***     
      Volunteer Int    .02 2.80**   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .01 2.67** 
BenSelf  Amotive -.07 -3.16**     
      Volunteer Int    .02 2.66**   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .01 2.56** 
Moral Oblig  Internal .13 4.71***     
      Volunteer Int    .04 3.24***   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .01 3.04*** 
Moral Oblig Amotive -.04 -2.09**     
      Volunteer Int    .01 1.88   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 1.84 
Relig Oblig External  .24 7.14***     
      Volunteer Int    .01 1.12   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 1.12 
Pers Respons Internal  .01 1.11     
      Volunteer Int    .00 1.11   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 1.12 
Pers Respons  External  -.01 -.16     
      Volunteer Int    .00 -.91   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 -0.91 
Pers Respons  Amotive  -.05 -2.50**     
      Volunteer Int    .01 2.00*   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .01 1.98* 
Sum of the Indirect Effects 
Study 2 Ben God paths:  
      
Internal Motives .21 6.04
***
     
External Motives .23 6.75
***
     
Amotivation -.16 -5.39
***
     
Volunteer Intentions   .11 4.98
*** 
  
Volunteer Sign-Up      .04 4.23
*** 
a
 All standard errors for Motives < .04, Vol Intention & Vol Sign-Ups < .01. 
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Table 17.  Standardized indirect effects for paths depicted in the final model 
between the exogenous variable AuthGod and the endogenous variables: Motives, 
Volunteer Intentions, and Volunteer Sign-Up, in Study 2 
 
 
Path from AuthGod  
 
Motives 
Volunteer 
Intentions 
Volunteer 
Sign-Up
b 
 IE IE/SE
a 
IE IE/SE
a
 IE IE/SE
a
 
BenSelf  Internal  -.02 -1.27     
      Volunteer Int    .000 -1.24   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 -1.24 
BenSelf  Amotive .02 1.27     
      Volunteer Int    .00 -1.24   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 -1.24 
Moral Oblig  Internal .00 .05     
      Volunteer Int    .00 .05   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 .05 
Moral Oblig Amotive .00 -.05     
      Volunteer Int    .00 .05   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 .05 
Relig Oblig External  .17 6.43***     
      Volunteer Int    .00 1.10   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 1.10 
Personal Respons Internal  .00 -.70     
      Volunteer Int    .00 -.70   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 -.70 
Pers Respons  External  .00 .62     
      Volunteer Int    .00 .57   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 .57 
Pers Respons  Amotive  .01 .73     
      Volunteer Int    .00 -.71   
      Volunteer Sign-Up     .00 -.71 
Sum of the Indirect Effects 
Study 2 AuthGod paths:  
      
Internal Motives -.02 -.62     
External Motives .17 6.45
***
     
Amotivation .03 1.09     
Volunteer Intentions   .00 -.14
 
  
Volunteer Sign-Up      .00 -.14
 
a
 All standard errors for Motives < .04, Vol Intention & Vol Sign-Ups < .01. 
b
 There were no significant paths from Motives to Volunteer Intentions for 
AuthGod 
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Furthermore, three paths in the original conceptual model which were 
significant in Study 1 were non-significant in Study 2: (1) AuthGod  Personal 
Responsibility, (2) Personal Responsibility to Internal Motivation, and (3) 
External Motivation  Intentions to Volunteer.  The re-specified model, shown in 
Figure 13, provided a good fit for the data, X
2 
(32) = 52, RMSEA = .04, CFI = 
.98, SRMR = .04, accounting for 16% of the variance in Volunteer Sign-ups and 
19% of the variance in Intentions to Volunteer.   
The sums of the indirect effects for BenGod and AuthGod in the model 
are show in Tables 16 and 17, respectively.  Importantly, in the structural model 
from Study 2, there were no significant indirect pathways from AuthGod to 
Volunteer Intentions or Volunteer Sign-up.  Instead, Volunteer Intentions and 
Volunteer Sign-up were significantly predicted by the indirect effects of BenGod. 
As a final step, the interaction term BenGod(T2) x Benevolent Self (T2) was 
computed across the full data set, and the interaction tested as a predictor of 
Internal Motivations at T2.  The interaction was not significant, p = .69.  
Attempt to replicate the interactions from Study 1. 
 Several interactions were observed in the exploratory analyses of all 
possible between-class interactions that had been conducted in Study 1.  
However, because no hypotheses had been made concerning these interactions 
and since some percentage of multiple tests for significance are likely to be 
positive, I attempted to replicate the interactions from Study 1 using the complete 
data set from Study 2.  As in the exploratory analyses in Study 1, the strategy was 
to center all variables (here, using the post-test scores), create interaction terms 
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for each of the between-class variables (e.g., AuthGod by Personal 
Responsibility); and then, using SPSS software, to test all possible (n = 53) 
regression equations (e.g., Amotivation regressed on AuthGodxPersResp). 
 Only one of the 53 interactions was significant in both Studies 1 and 2: 
Amotivation regressed on AuthGod by Religious Obligation, β = -.11, p = .03 in 
Study 1, and β = -.11, p = .05 in Study 2.  As shown in Figure 14, the association 
between religious obligation and amotivation increased as AuthGod increased. 
Figure 14. Plot of Interaction of AuthGod by Religious Obligation on 
Amotivation 
 
 
 When included in the full path model, there was a significant improvement 
in the Chi-square relative to the degrees of freedom, ΔX2 (7) = 47, p < .001. 
However, the other three fit indices were degraded and indicated a less than 
adequate fit, X
2 
(39) = 99, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .92, SRMR = .07. 
Discussion 
 Activating beliefs about the self and the world have been shown to alter 
opinions about God’s nature (Epley, et al., 2009).  However, beliefs about God 
may also affect beliefs about the Self and the World.  For example, when people 
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convert to a new religious group, their values and goals also often change 
(Rambo, 1993). Thus, the purpose of Study 2 was to test whether temporarily 
priming different concepts of God influences certain downstream beliefs and 
motivations, ultimately leading to volunteer intentions and volunteer behavior.   
 However, a manipulation check of the effectiveness of the explicit 
scriptural primes used in Study 2 indicated that belief in a benevolent God was 
largely unaffected by reminders of God’s benevolent nature.  This may be 
because the scores of BenGod were nearly at ceiling (M = 6.39 on a 1-7 Likert 
scale) in this group comprised of Christian believers only.  Moreover, although 
ratings for AuthGod did increase in the AuthGodPrime condition between time 1 
and time 2, people in the AuthGod condition did not differ significantly at time 2 
from people in the other experimental groups, calling into question either the 
effectiveness or the duration of the priming manipulations.   
 Ratings on the individual item, “God is authoritarian” did decrease in the 
BenGodPrime condition, although these differences did not reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance (p = .10).  There was also an (albeit non-
significant) increase in the “God is Authoritarian” single item scores in both the 
Religion Control and the AuthGodPrime condition; and that increase was greater 
for the single item than for the full scale.  The single items were presented among 
other questions on the first page of the religion section in the Benevolence 
Survey.  This suggests that whatever small effects there may have been due to the 
prime may have been negated as individuals considered all 30 adjectives 
describing God’s nature later in the section.   
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 Overall, however, it must be concluded that the priming manipulations 
were weak, thus making it difficult to confidently interpret subsequent analyses. 
 Further, contrary to my hypothesis, individuals in the BenGodPrime 
condition were not significantly more likely to have Intentions to Volunteer and 
were not more likely to Volunteer, another indication that there were seemingly 
no direct effects of the BenGodPrime on volunteerism.   
 Since the BenGodPrime condition was ineffective in increasing belief in a 
Benevolent God, it is not surprising that there were also no increases in 
Benevolent Self, Moral Obligation, or Personal Responsibility.  However, when 
the BenGodPrime condition was considered individually, there was a significant 
increase in Religious Obligation – the strongest path from BenGod to Beliefs 
about Self & the World in both Study 1 (β = .36) and Study 2 (β = .43).   
 Scores on both Internal and External Motives also significantly increased 
in the BenGodPrime condition.  These effects, coupled with the increase in 
Religious Obligation, suggest that, given a more effective prime, reminders of 
God’s benevolence may indirectly increase volunteer motivations.  Yet increased 
motivations to volunteer do not seem to translate into intentions to act. 
 Although the differences from T1 to T2 were not significant across all four 
groups (except for internal motivations), the AuthGodPrime condition seems to 
have had some influence inasmuch as people primed with an Authoritarian God-
concept significantly decreased in ratings of Benevolent Self, increased in 
Personal Responsibility, and increased in External Motivation.  As predicted by 
the model, these effects were null in their impact on Volunteer Intentions because 
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the positive effects of increased External Motivation are offset by the negative 
effects due to a decrease in Benevolent Self.  It is less clear, however, why scores 
on Personal Responsibility would increase in the AuthGodPrime condition.   
 Finally and unexpectedly, Belief in a Just World for Others increased 
significantly in each of the religion priming conditions and in the Religion 
Control (reading scriptures from Proverbs).  It is intriguing to think that BJWO 
may be enhanced by religious primes.  On the other hand, there may have simply 
been an increase in familiarity with the items from T1 to T2.  In any case, as in 
Study 1, BJWO was not a significant predictor of Volunteer Motives after 
controlling for the effects of Benevolent Self, Moral Obligation, Religious 
Obligation, and Personal Responsibility.  Again, any of the modest results 
reported here should be interpreted with caution and seem to merely suggest 
trends in the data.  
Despite the uncertain results of the priming experiment, Study 2 afforded 
an opportunity to test the fit of the data to the final Conceptual Model from Study 
1.  The path model and indirect effects were largely supported by the data in 
Study 2 except that External Motives, while strongly associated with both 
concepts of God in Study 2, were not predictive of Intentions to Volunteer. 
 Finally, only one of the exploratory interactions observed in Study 1 was 
replicated in Study 2; that is, there was an interaction of AuthGod by Religious 
Obligation in predicting Amotivation such that those high in AuthGod but low in 
Religious Obligation were more likely to report that Volunteering is useless (i.e., 
Amotivation).  It seems plausible that people who are focused on God’s wrath but 
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who may have rejected religious obligations may also be unlikely to help others.  
It was unclear the extent to which this interaction contributes to our understanding 
of the linkages between God-concepts and Volunteerism; however, this 
interaction should be addressed in future research. 
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Chapter 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This research addressed the question whether concepts of God influence 
secular volunteerism among Christians – where secular volunteerism is defined as 
acts within an organizational context that provide service to the community at 
large.  It was hypothesized that belief in a benevolent, compassionate, helping 
God would be positively associated with a benevolent self-identity, perceived 
religious and moral obligations, and the ascription of personal responsibility to 
help.  These beliefs about the self and the world were, in turn, expected to be 
associated with internal and external volunteer motivations and a sense of regret if 
one does not help (i.e., introjected motivation).  Consequently, belief in a 
benevolent God was expected to have positive indirect effects on intentions to 
volunteer and on acts of secular volunteerism.   
Belief in an authoritarian God, who dispenses rewards and punishments, 
was also expected to be positively associated with both a moral and religious 
obligation to help – but not a benevolent self-identity.  These obligations were, in 
turn, expected to be associated with both internal and external volunteer 
motivations and a sense of regret if one does not volunteer.  However, belief in an 
authoritarian God was also predicted to be associated with beliefs that the world is 
just and, generally, people get what they deserve.  Consequently, there may be a 
lack of personal responsibility to come to the aid of others – particularly for those 
outside the religious community – leading to the belief that helping is useless or 
unwarranted (i.e., amotivation).  Thus, in contrast to the effects of belief in a 
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benevolent God, belief in an authoritarian God was posited to elicit internal, 
introjected, and external motives but also amotivation.  Therefore, the sum of the 
indirect effects on intentions to volunteer for secular causes was expected to be 
non-significant.    
A conceptual model was developed with proposed pathways between four 
classes of variables: Beliefs about God, Beliefs about the Self and the World, 
Volunteer Motivations, and Volunteer Intentions.  The related hypotheses and the 
structural equations of the conceptual model were tested in two studies, one 
correlational (Study 1) and one experimental (Study 2).   
Study 1 consisted of an online survey administered to Christian (Catholics, 
Protestants, Evangelical Christians, etc.) undergraduates at Arizona State 
University enrolled in sociology or introductory psychology.  Participants who 
were pre-screened for belief in God completed measures of each of the variables 
in the conceptual model in three ostensibly unrelated sections: Volunteerism, 
Social Attitudes (Beliefs about the Self and the World), and Religion.  The 
correlational data from this Benevolence Survey enabled me to test (1) the 
psychological constructs of Benevolent and Authoritarian God, (2) the 
mediational pathways in the conceptual model, and (3) the adequacy of an 
alternative model with both mediation and moderation. 
In Study 2, Christian introductory psychology students who were 
prescreened for belief in God participated in a three-week study with an 
experimental design.  In Week 1, participants completed the online Benevolence 
Survey (from Study 1) in the lab, omitting the Volunteer section.  When 
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participants returned to the lab in Week 2, the concepts of a Benevolent or an 
Authoritarian God were experimentally manipulated by presenting scriptures to 
be remembered in a bogus memory test.  Participants were then administered the 
Benevolence Survey for a second time with all sections included.  Participants 
were also invited to sign up, without credit or compensation, to participate in a 
volunteer project to be conducted in the lab during Week 3.  Thus, the study was 
designed to test the indirect causal influence of Authoritarian or Benevolent God-
concepts on Volunteerism relative to a religion control (neutral scriptures) and a 
secular control (tips for organizing a desk).   
Summary of Results 
In order to test the Conceptual Model, I first examined the newly 
developed God-concept measurement model consisting of 30 adjectives as 
indicators of the concepts of either a Benevolent or Authoritarian God.  Finding 
that the proposed measurement model was not a good fit for the data, an 
exploratory factor analysis was performed to identify the number of factors and 
the adjectives with the highest single factor loadings.  A subsequent confirmatory 
factor analysis indicated that the concept of Benevolent God could be defined as 
helping, compassionate, caring, generous, forgiving, gracious, accepting, and 
merciful (eight items), and that Authoritarian God could be defined as strict, 
commanding, controlling, restricting, stern, punishing, critical, angry, wrathful, 
and judging (ten items).  Two additional factors, Protecting God and Just God 
were found to be separate constructs and were examined in post hoc analyses in 
Study 1 only.   
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Conclusions regarding benevolent God-concepts. 
A full path analysis of the data in Study 1 largely supported the 
hypotheses and proposed pathways in the conceptual model.  After re-specifying 
some paths in the model (discussed below), five significant, positive, indirect 
pathways from Benevolent God (BenGod) to Volunteer Intentions were 
identified: (1) BenGod  Benevolent Self  Internal Motivations, (2) BenGod 
 Benevolent Self  low scores on Amotivation, (3) BenGod  Moral 
Obligation  Internal Motivation, (4) BenGod  Religious Obligation  
External Motivation, and (5) BenGod  Personal Responsibility  low scores on 
Amotivation.  There was one significant, negative, indirect pathway, BenGod 
Personal Responsibility  low scores on External Motivation.   
Study 2 afforded an opportunity to attempt to replicate the structural 
equations in the revised model from Study 1.  This analysis revealed that there 
were two main differences between the two studies pertaining to belief in a 
benevolent God.  First, the single negative path from BenGod to Intentions to 
Volunteer via Personal Responsibility and External Motivation was not 
significant in Study 2.  Second, although the path BenGod  Religious 
Obligation  External Motives was significant, External Motivations did not 
predict Intentions to Volunteer in Study 2.   
Across the two studies, and consistent with self-determination theory, 
internal motives were robust predictors of Intentions to Volunteer.  Taking into 
account the sums of the indirect effects across the two studies, a revised model 
predicting the effects of BenGod on intentions to volunteer is shown in Figure 15.  
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In the model, BenGod is associated with four types of beliefs: a Benevolent Self-
identity, a perceived Moral Obligation, a perceived Religious Obligation, and a 
sense of Personal Responsibility to act responsibly even if others do not.  Moral 
Obligation and Benevolent Self are associated with high scores on Internal 
Motivation; Benevolent Self and Personal Responsibility are associated with low 
scores on Amotivation; and a Religious Obligation is associated with External 
Motives – the least potent pathway in the BenGod model. 
Figure 15. Revised Conceptual Model for Benevolent God 
 
Note: Correlations between the variables within-class are not shown for clarity. 
Conclusions regarding authoritarian God-concepts. 
The indirect effects of belief in an authoritarian God were more complex 
and a revised model for Authoritarian God is depicted in Figure 16.  On the one 
hand, there was one significant, positive, indirect effect of AuthGod on Intentions 
to Volunteer via Religious Obligation and External Motivation in Study 1.  On the 
other hand, there were also three significant, negative, indirect paths from 
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AuthGod to Intentions to Volunteer: (1) AuthGod  low scores on Benevolent 
Self  low scores on Internal Motivations, (2) AuthGod  low scores on 
Benevolent Self  Amotivation, and (3) AuthGod  low scores on Personal 
Responsibility  Amotivation.  Thus, overall, there was a net (i.e., a null) indirect 
effect on Intentions to Volunteer in both Studies 1 and 2. 
Figure 15. Revised Conceptual Model for Authoritarian God 
 
Note: Correlations between the variables within class are not shown for clarity 
One striking difference between the two studies pertains to the effects of 
AuthGod on Personal Responsibility.  In Study 1, there was a significant 
interaction of AuthGod by Personal Responsibility on Amotivation.  However, 
this effect did not replicate in Study 2.   
On the other hand, scores for Personal Responsibility seem to have 
increased in the AuthGodPrime condition.  Indeed, previous research suggests 
that reminders that “God is watching” increases prosocial behavior (Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007) and that a belief in an authoritarian God decreases cheating 
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(Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011) – attitudes measured by the Personal Responsibility 
scale.   
It may be that Authoritarian God primes are only effective for the subset 
of individuals who also have a low sense of Personal Responsibility.  Since the 
strength of the interaction and effectiveness of the prime are both in doubt, it 
remains for future research to clarify the relation between AuthGod and Personal 
Responsibility.  In the revised model, I continue to hypothesize that belief in an 
Authoritarian God predicts low scores on Personal Responsibility mainly because 
the correlation between AuthGod and Personal Responsibility was negative in 
both studies (although non-significant in Study 2).   
Unexpectedly, belief in an authoritarian God was uncorrelated with a 
perceived moral obligation to volunteer to help others.  This is in contrast to the 
effects of belief in a benevolent God and is important because Moral Obligations 
are associated with the more powerful Internal Volunteer motivations whereas 
Religious Obligations are only related to the less potent External Volunteer 
motivations.   
Finally, in contrast with previous research (Pichon & Saroglou, 2009) and 
the model predictions, BJWO was not predictive of Volunteer Motivations after 
partialling out the effects of other beliefs about the self and the world.  Although 
this variable has, consequently, been omitted from the revised model, it is 
important to continue to try and identify what role BJWO (and, perhaps, related 
constructs such as Belief in a Dangerous World or Social Dominance Orientation) 
might play in relation to Personal Responsibility and Authoritarian God-concepts. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Study 2 was designed to activate thoughts of a Benevolent or 
Authoritarian God in order to test the causal direction of these effects.  There 
were some very modest changes in scores for the measured variables.  However, 
taking a conservative approach, it can only be concluded that the primes were 
ineffective and that no claims regarding causal relations can be made from this 
study.  
Nevertheless, there were trends in the data that suggest research should 
continue in this direction.  For example, the Conceptual Model predicts that 
increases in belief in an Authoritarian God should lead to decreases in Benevolent 
Self-identity and this was the case in Study 2 in the AuthGodPrime condition.  As 
another example, Internal Motivations would be expected to increase under a 
BenGodPrime only, and this was also the case in Study 2.  As a third example, the 
Conceptual Model predicts that reminders of both a benevolent and an 
authoritarian God should increase External Motivation and this was the case in 
every condition, including (unexpectedly) the Secular Control condition.   
Thus, future studies should focus on developing more effective primes of 
God-concepts.  One possibility would be to use a more implicit manipulation such 
as religious images which have been shown to be effective in other studies 
(Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2012). However, there is also some benefit to 
refining the explicit primes used here because, ultimately, this research will be 
most useful in understanding how religious leaders might tailor their sermons and 
teachings to effect the behavior of religious adherents.  In regard to the 
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Authoritarian God prime, for example, reading scriptures explicitly portraying 
God as angry and wrathful did seem to have an effect inasmuch as scores on the 
two measures of AuthGod increased from pre-test to post-test in the Authoritarian 
God prime condition.  However, because the randomization of participants by 
condition appears to have failed (participants in the AuthGod condition had lower 
scores on AuthGod on the pre-test), even after the prime, scores for AuthGod at 
post-test were equivalent across the four groups and not higher in the AuthGod 
condition.   
Another possibility would be to use a shorter scale to measure concepts of 
God.  It may be the case that asking participants to answer 30 questions about 
God’s nature diminished whatever effects of the prime there might have been.  A 
third possibility would be to more carefully evaluate the possibility of reactance to 
messages about God’s authoritarian nature.  For example, in pilot tests rating the 
primes, only about 69% of the students rated the AuthGod scriptures as 
authoritarian whereas 83% rated the BenGod scriptures as benevolent.   
Activating thoughts of a Benevolent God appears to be more problematic 
because ratings for BenGod among Christians who believe in God were nearly at 
ceiling.  This is consistent with results obtained by Froese and Bader (2010) who 
found that nearly 85% of Americans believe that God is loving, and that only 
estimations of God’s punishing nature varied widely within religious groups. 
This research was limited in several other ways as well.  First, it will be 
important in future research to successfully include a behavioral measure of 
volunteerism.  This may involve completing additional surveys without 
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compensation, taking information flyers to hand out, or staying for some 
additional amount of time to package school supplies rather than returning the 
following week.   
Secondly, although it is useful and informative to understand the beliefs 
and volunteer behaviors of Christians – the dominant religious group in the U.S. – 
the findings presented here may not generalize to other religious groups or other 
measures of generosity.  For example, Muslims or Jews may be more likely to 
cultivate a reverential fear of God and have a more powerful sense of religious 
obligation relative to Christians.  In that case, the net positive indirect effect of 
belief in an Authoritarian God may be enhanced for Muslims and Jews.  
Moreover, Muslims and Jews may be less likely to volunteer yet more likely to 
donate financial resources due to differences in the religious culture (Benthall & 
Bellion-Jourdan, 2003; Rimor & Tobin, 1990).   
Additionally, there are age differences in volunteer motivation (Okun & 
Schultz, 2003) and the findings obtained in college student samples may not 
generalize to other age groups.   
Another important outcome of the present research was the preliminary 
effort to develop a measurement model of the concepts of Benevolent and 
Authoritarian God.  As can be seen in this and previous research (e.g., Benson & 
Spilka, 1973; Froese & Bader, 2010; Rosmarin, et al., 2009), these concepts are 
differentially predictive of a number of beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and 
motivations; yet there is no generally accepted scale for measuring these different 
concepts of God. 
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Conclusion 
Volunteerism benefits both the recipient and the benefactor; yet the 
religious beliefs and motivations underlying volunteerism have not been well 
understood. This research merges two disconnected literatures – the psychology 
of religion and the psychology of prosociality to suggest that varying concepts of 
God are associated with different beliefs that, in turn, undergird varying volunteer 
motivations.   
It is my hope that the theoretical model investigated here can be useful to 
clinicians, volunteer organizations, and Christian religious leaders – and also 
potentially extended to non-Abrahamic and secularist traditions – whose members 
can choose to focus on the good, the benevolent, and not the judgmental, nature of 
their own human role models, saints, and deities.  This can impel people to 
positively change their self-concept and sense of moral obligation, fostering 
helping motivations, and thus promoting universal compassion and prosociality. 
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God-concepts 
 
There are many ways of thinking about God but some of God’s traits seem more 
relevant to us than others.  Using a wide range of the 1 to 7 point scale below, 
please rate how well each word describes God BASED UPON YOUR OWN, 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
Benevolent items 
Helping, Compassionate, Caring, Generous, Concerned, Forgiving, Gracious, 
Accepting, Merciful, Pardoning, Protecting, Shielding, Defending, Sheltering, 
Guarding 
 
Authoritarian items 
Commanding, Strict, Controlling, Restricting, Stern, Judging, Master, Angry, 
Wrathful, Critical, Punishing, Just, Fair-minded, Unbiased, Impartial 
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Benevolent self (alpha = .79) 
 
Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person: 
 
Caring, compassionate, accepting of others, generous, helpful 
 
The person with these characteristics could be you or someone else.  For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.  
Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act.  When you have a clear image 
of what this person would be like, answer the following questions on the 7 point 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  TRY TO USE A WIDE 
RANGE OF THE SCALE. 
 
I am the sort of person who has these characteristics 
It would make me feel good to be the kind of person who has these characteristics 
Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am 
I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics ( R ) 
Having these characteristics is not really that important to me ( R ) 
I strongly desire to have these characteristics 
 
 
Moral Obligation (alpha = .77) 
I personally feel I have an absolute moral obligation to help others 
Volunteering is an important moral activity 
People have a moral obligation to help others 
Helping is a matter of choice, not an obligation (Reverse keyed) 
 
 
Religious Obligation (alpha = .81) 
I have a religious obligation to help others 
The scriptures command people to help others 
God commands people to help one another 
God expects people to obey the commandments 
 
 
Belief in a Just World for Others (BJWO; alpha = .75) 
The world treats people fairly  
People get what they deserve  
People earn the rewards and punishments they get  
People get what they are entitled to have  
A person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded  
When people meet with misfortune, they typically have brought it upon themselve 
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Personal Responsibility (alpha = .70) 
No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of 
them.  
When people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat them well.(R) 
I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than a clean one. (R) 
With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school these days, the 
individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at fault. (R) 
It doesn't make much sense to be very concerned about how we act when we are 
sick and feeling miserable. (R) 
When you have a job to do, it is impossible to look out for everybody's best 
interest. (R) 
It is not up to me to take care of other people. (R) 
You can’t blame basically good people who are forced by a situation to be 
inconsiderate of others. (R) [item added to increase reliability; item was included 
in Schwartz’s original scale (1968)] 
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VOLUNTEER MOTIVES 
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Volunteer motivations: 
 
If you are currently volunteering, please indicate to what extent each of the 
following reasons is a personal motive for why you do volunteer. If you are not 
currently volunteering, there is a very good chance that you will be asked to do so 
in the future. Please indicate to what extent each of the following reasons would 
be a personal motive for why you volunteer. Use the 7-point scale provided below 
to make your ratings.  
 
I do (would) volunteer… 
Internal (alpha = .87)
 
because it is one of the ways I live my life 
because helping others is an integral part of my life 
because volunteering is a part of who I am 
because it’s something that is fulfilling for me as a person 
because it is a wise thing to do 
because volunteering is a suitable activity for me 
because it’s a good way to contribute 
because it’s something that contributes to my personal growth 
Introjected (alpha = .78) 
because I would feel guilty if I did not volunteer  
because I would regret not doing volunteering 
because I would feel very bad if I did not help others 
because I would be ashamed if I did not volunteer 
External (alpha = .72)
 
because God rewards people who help others 
because I will earn rewards in the afterlife 
because God is pleased when I volunteer 
because I want to avoid being criticized by my religious group 
Amotivation (alpha = .86) 
I don’t know; I can’t see how volunteering really helps 
I don’t know; volunteering is just a waste of my time  
I don’t know; I can’t see what I’m getting out of it 
         I don’t know; I can’t see how my efforts are helping others when I volunteer 
  
  154 
APPENDIX D  
INTENTIONS TO VOLUNTEER 
  
  155 
Intentions to volunteer (alpha = .90) 
 
Each year various volunteer activities are planned for student participation, and 
volunteer organizations are constantly reassessing the kinds of activities students 
are most interest in.  Using the 7-point scale provided below, please take a 
moment and indicate how likely you would be to volunteer during the next 12 
months if given the opportunity for the following activities: 
 
Volunteer intentions for the benefit of U.S. (alpha = .83) 
Helping underpriviledged youths learn to read 
Helping distribute food at a local food bank 
Helping build housing for poor families  
Delivering food to families whose husbands are in prison 
Distributing reading materials to hospice patients 
 
Volunteer intentions for the benefit of those outside the U.S. (alpha = .96) 
Packaging hygiene items (e.g., toothbrushes, soap) to ship to natural 
disaster victims in Pakistan 
Packaging hygiene items (e.g., toothbrushes, soap) to ship to natural 
disaster victims in Israel 
Packaging hygiene items (e.g., toothbrushes, soap) to ship to natural 
disaster victims in Haiti 
  
  156 
APPENDIX E  
HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL 
  
  157 
 
  
  158 
 
  
